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COMMERCIAL SPEECH, FIRST AMENDMENT




Commercial speech is no longer the stepchild of the First
Amendment. Long all but ignored and summarily excluded from the
prestigious reach of one of our most foundational constitutional
guarantees,' commercial speech took its first major step toward
validation in the Supreme Court's decision in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.2 But as
significant as Virginia Board was as a historical and doctrinal matter,
it left much to be desired as a coherent statement of First
Amendment theory. It was likely this failure that led to the stark
second class status and treatment the concept received for the better
part of two decades.3 Today, the situation in the trenches appears to
be dramatically different. In every recent commercial speech case
decided by the Supreme Court, the First Amendment argument
* Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern University
School of Law. The author wishes to thank Mathew Arnould of the class of 2009 and Abby
Mollen and Kerry Slade of the class of 2008 for their valuable research help.
1. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (summarily rejecting First
Amendment protection for commercial speech). For a description of the early history of the
commercial speech doctrine, see Ronald D. Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080.
2. 425 U.S. 748, 770-73 (1976) (holding that truthful commercial speech is protected by
the First Amendment).
3. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989)
(keeping the protection afforded to commercial speech subordinate to that afforded to non-
commercial speech by refusing to impose a "least restrictive means" standard); Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) ("[C]ommercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure of
protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment
values ...").
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prevailed.4 These results are in sharp contrast to the much more hit-
or-miss record of the pro-commercial speech cause in earlier years.
While it would be incorrect to suggest that commercial speech is
today deemed fungible with fully protected speech in all contexts, 5 it
is at least true that the gap between the two is far narrower than it
was in 1976.
Despite this significant alteration in judicial outcomes, certain
aspects of the modem commercial speech debate are, sadly, much the
same as before. For one thing, the Court at least purports to be
applying the "First Amendment Lite" type of protection that it first
adopted in its famed four-part Central Hudson test in 1980. It does
so, despite the fact that the end results of what is supposedly the
same commercial speech-specific test are now far more protective
than they once were. Moreover, respected scholars have long
conducted a form of guerilla warfare on commercial speech
protection. Some object to the extension of any First Amendment
protection at all.6 Others have made clear their objection, not to the
extension of any level of First Amendment protection, but rather to
the extension of full First Amendment protection, a standard that-
preposterously, they believe-would treat commercial advertising,
for constitutional purposes, interchangeably with the works of
Shakespeare, Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I have a dream" sermon, or
William Jennings Bryan's famed "cross of gold" speech.7
The nature of these scholarly attacks on commercial speech
protection can be placed within three broad categories: (1) rationalist,
(2) intuitionist, and (3) ideological. Arguments included in the first
category put forward specific reasons that, as a matter of First
Amendment theory and principle, commercial speech is to be
4. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 377 (2002); Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 566 (2001).
5. For example, false commercial speech is automatically excluded from the scope of the
First Amendment. Compare Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980) (stating that for commercial speech to come within the First Amendment's
protection, it "must concern lawful activity and not be misleading"), with N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (explaining that certain categories of false non-
commercial speech receive the protection of the "actual malice" test).
6. E.g., C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and
Redish 's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646, 652-57 (1982); see discussion infra
Part II.C. .d.
7. See, e.g., Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 27 (2000) (discussing the difference between public discourse and commercial speech).
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deemed undeserving of First Amendment protection, or at least as
much protection as given to more traditionally protected forms of
expression. Those arguments falling within the second category
appeal, rather, to some intuitive notion as to what free expression is
all about, concluding, on the basis of a synthesis of those intuitions,
that commercial speech is undeserving of full protection. Those that
fall into the third category differ from those in the first two
categories in that they are openly grounded on the perceived evils of
the economic system of which commercial speech is a part.
In this Article, I will demonstrate that, to all too great an extent,
all three forms of criticism of commercial speech suffer from the
same fundamental flaw: each either constitutes, facilitates, or, at the
very least, comes dangerously close to a constitutionally destructive
form of viewpoint-based regulation. As such, each gives rise,
ironically in the name of the First Amendment, to the most
universally condemned threat to the foundations of free expression-
suppression based on the regulators' subjective disagreement with or
disdain for the views being expressed.8
To be sure, the three forms of attack on commercial speech
protection differ significantly in how they ultimately reach their end
result of viewpoint regulation. Criticisms that fall within the third
category, for example, are refreshingly candid in their ideological
cast, and it is therefore mercifully easy to expose their true nature.
They are avowedly premised on acceptance of a particular political
or ideological perspective that is hostile to capitalism and its logical
outgrowths or implications. There is, of course, no reason in the
world that scholars cannot vigorously attack all of the evils of
capitalism and commercialism, and argue that the logical result is
that speech that fosters or furthers such an economic system should
be disdained. The problem is that these arguments are made not
merely on a normative political level as part of a broader substantive
debate, but rather as a basis on which to determine the reach of the
First Amendment. Such a practice is a risky endeavor for those on
both sides of any normative political issue. Any student of free
8. The one possible exception to my critique are those free speech theorists who exclude
protection of commercial speech because they believe that the First Amendment protects only
purely political expression and who, therefore, exclude all forms of non-political speech,
including literature, art and science, as well as commercial speech. While I believe that such an
approach is grossly underprotective as a matter of First Amendment theory, it would be incorrect
to view it as a form of viewpoint regulation. See infra Part V.
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expression should be able to explain that the level of constitutional
protection extended to expression cannot be determined by the extent
to which the regulator agrees or disagrees with the views expressed.
Adoption of such an approach would automatically transform First
Amendment interpretation into a political state of nature. Whoever
controls the official channels of constitutional interpretation would
then be permitted to exclude from the First Amendment's scope any
expression which they happen to deem deeply immoral or offensive.
As is so often the case in constitutional law, then, we should warn
those who want to exclude commercial speech from the First
Amendment's scope because they condemn the commercialism of
which it is an outgrowth: "Be careful what you wish for."
The other two categories are somewhat more complex and
therefore more difficult to characterize as a form of invidious
viewpoint regulation. Indeed, attacks in the first category appear, at
least superficially, to represent the very opposite of an unprincipled,
politically motivated approach to First Amendment interpretation.
To the contrary, they appear to be grounded in a form of objective
and principled constitutional analysis. It is my position, however,
that all such claimed principled justifications are fatally and
illogically underinclusive. In each case the justification asserted to
support reduced protection for commercial speech applies with equal
force to one or more categories of non-commercial expression that
are still assumed to receive full First Amendment protection. Thus,
what superficially appears to constitute a plausible and principled
rationale for reducing protection for commercial speech in reality
applies its basis for reduced protection, irrationally and unjustifiably,
to commercial speech but not to various forms of fully protected
non-commercial speech. Careful analysis demonstrates that if the
asserted criteria are employed properly as principled, legitimate, and
consistently applied grounds on which to reduce constitutional
protection, then logically they should also lead to the exclusion or
reduction of protection for the parallel non-commercial speech
category saddled with the identical flaw. On the other hand, if the
asserted rationale is assumed not to justify reduced protection for
various forms of non-commercial speech, then logically it should be
equally insufficient to justify reduced protection for commercial
speech. It is this very point that lies at the core of Herbert
Wechsler's famed "neutral principles" analysis: Once a court that is
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
interpreting and applying a constitutional provision has chosen a
principled basis for decision, it may not selectively ignore that
principle in subsequent cases when its use would lead to politically
distasteful conclusions.9  Rather, for judicial legitimacy to be
maintained, the constitutional principle must be applied neutrally in
all situations to which that principle applies.°
It does not automatically follow, of course, that the inconsistent
and selective application of what are, in the abstract, rational criteria
constitutes viewpoint-based regulation. Indeed, on occasion some of
the strongest opponents of commercial speech protection have come
from the political right-hardly the place from which one would
normally fear anti-capitalist viewpoint-based regulation." However,
these commentators' or jurists' views can largely be explained on the
basis of their largely misguided underprotectiveness of free
expression. My concern over indirect or furtive viewpoint-based
discrimination, rather, focuses on scholars and jurists who are
normally associated with a generally more protective approach
toward free expression. It is their logically indefensible refusal to
extend full protection to commercial speech that, I believe, is
appropriately seen as viewpoint driven.
Strategically selective application of abstract principles is often
associated with furtive or indirect forms of viewpoint-based
regulation. For example, imagine a Chicago city ordinance that
makes it a crime to distribute anti-war literature on Michigan Avenue
during rush hour. The asserted justification for the regulation is the
viewpoint-neutral contention that distribution of literature at this
particular time and place would be disruptive to important
governmental interests, such as safety and traffic flow. Such a
viewpoint-neutral rationale may or may not justify speech regulation.
The answer to that question turns on a complex assessment of
numerous criteria and is well beyond the scope of this Article. In the
hypothetical ordinance, however, the validity of this asserted
rationale is beside the point, because the identical harm would result
from distribution of pro-war literature or, for that matter, any type of
literature. The fatally underinclusive nature of the ordinance's limi-
9. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 15-16 (1959).
10. Id.
11. See infra note 140.
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tation inexorably leads to the conclusion that the ordinance is
effectively viewpoint based. A similar analysis, I believe, is equally
applicable to the fatally underinclusive justifications for reduced
protection for commercial speech.
The remaining category of commercial speech opposition, which
I have labeled "intuitionist," amounts to neither direct viewpoint-
based discrimination nor furtive, indirect viewpoint discrimination.
However, because of its inherently non-rational nature, intuitionist
analysis may easily serve as either a catalyst or a cover for the
implementation of such invidious discrimination. It is thus appro-
priately seen as an "enabler" of viewpoint discrimination. One can
easily assert that one's own First Amendment intuition leads to the
exclusion or reduction of constitutional protection for commercial
speech. But because by definition an intuitionist justification need
not be grounded in rational argument, such intuition may derive
(consciously or subconsciously) from a background political or
ideological prejudice against either commercial speech itself or the
capitalist economic system in which it functions. Equally troubling
is the threat which such anti-intellectual "grunting" causes to every
aspect of First Amendment thought, right down to its core, for
intuitionist justifications are inherently immune to any form of
rational critique.
Even if one were to accept everything I have written to this
point, there would nevertheless exist a pervasive analytical obstacle
to characterizing any or all of these rationales as viewpoint
discriminations. Classical viewpoint discrimination selectively regu-
lates (or protects) speech on the basis of regulatory hostility to a
specific social, political or moral position sought to be expressed by
the speaker. This pathology, for the most part, is not technically true
of commercial speech regulation, even when the reduced protection
is openly grounded in hostility to commercial expression as a whole.
By the Court's own definition, commercial speech promotes sale of a
product or service. 2 Such expression, therefore, does not express a
political, social or moral viewpoint; if it did, it would no longer be
appropriately classified as commercial speech. One may therefore
challenge my characterization of hostility to commercial speech as a




form of viewpoint-based discrimination. At most, the argument
could be made that commercial speech regulation constitutes a form
of subject matter discrimination, a far less invidious-indeed, often
readily accepted-type of constitutional classification. While I fully
recognize this potential difficulty, I nevertheless conclude that any
approach grounded in hostility to commercial speech is appropriately
viewed not as subject matter categorization, but rather as viewpoint-
based discrimination. I reach this conclusion because I believe such
hostility falls within a "twilight zone" category of viewpoint discrim-
ination that, while not conceptually identical to traditional viewpoint-
based regulation, gives rise to much the same invidious threat to the
foundations of free expression.
This Article contains three main sections. The initial section
describes the three categories of arguments usually relied upon to
justify a reduced level of protection for commercial speech. 3 The
following section explores the nature of viewpoint discrimination
and the reasons why, as a matter of constitutional and political
theory, such discrimination must be categorically rejected as a basis
for First Amendment analysis. 4 The final section integrates the first
two sections by demonstrating that each of the categorical bases for
reducing or rejecting First Amendment protection for commercial
speech is, in one way or another, appropriately characterized as a
form of invidious and constitutionally impermissible viewpoint
discrimination. 15
II. THE ARGUMENTS FOR REDUCED COMMERCIAL SPEECH
PROTECTION: A CATEGORICAL APPROACH
A. Defining Commercial Speech
Until relatively late in the twentieth century, neither court nor
scholar had invested virtually any effort in fashioning a defense of
the summary exclusion of commercial speech protection from the
scope of First Amendment protection. 6 It was simply assumed,
without explanation or support, that commercial speech fell within
13. See infra Part 11.
14. See infra Part Ill.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (summarily rejecting First
Amendment protection for commercial speech).
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the area of far less protected property rights, rather than
constitutionally protected expression. 17  Since the Supreme Court's
decision to extend at least some level of First Amendment protection
to commercial speech, a scholarly cottage industry on the subject has
mushroomed. Some of it has advocated full, or at least substantial,
First Amendment protection. 8 Much of it-likely the overwhelming
majority-has rejected full or, on occasion, any First Amendment
protection for commercial speech. 9 Before I can attempt to achieve
my goal of categorizing and deconstructing the arguments against
full First Amendment protection for commercial speech, however, it
is necessary to define the concept. The term, it seems, is not self-
defining, and how one chooses to define "commercial speech" has a
potentially enormous impact on the validity of the attacks on its
protection.2"
While the Supreme Court has cryptically offered a number of
different-and not always consistent--definitions of commercial
speech,2' for all practical purposes the alternatives come down to
two: (1) speech concerning commercial products or services,22 or (2)
speech advocating the sale of commercial products or services (the
17. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 414 (1970) ("The rule
that communications in the 'commercial sector' of our society are outside the system of freedom
of expression.., has been widely observed, [but] has never been fully explained.").
18. Much of that scholarship has been my own. See MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS:
SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY 14-62 (2001) [hereinafter
REDISH, MONEY TALKS]; Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 431-48
(1971); see also Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA.
L. REV. 627, 648-52 (1990) (arguing that commercial speech should be afforded the same
protection as non-commercial speech).
19. E.g., C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62
IOWA L. REv. 1, 3 (1976) ("[A] complete denial of first amendment protection for commercial
speech is not only consistent with, but is required by, first amendment theory.").
20. See infra Part II.C.1.b-d.
21. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983) (holding that an
advertisement does not constitute commercial speech merely because of its form, references to a
product name, or because it derives from economic motivation, but rather because of a
combination of all of these characteristics); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980) (defining commercial speech as "expression related solely
to the economic interests of the speaker" and "speech proposing a commercial transaction").
Compare Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54 (defining commercial advertising as commercial speech), with
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384 (1973)
("[S]peech is not rendered commercial by the mere fact that it relates to an advertisement.").
22. This was the definition I assumed when, prior to the Court's extension of meaningful
First Amendment protection to commercial speech, I argued that commercial speech deserved
such protection.
[Vol. 41:67
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definition on which the Court appears to have settled).,3 Under the
first alternative, all expression concerning the quality, efficiency, or
safety of products or services for sale, regardless of the speaker,
would receive reduced or no protection. Thus, both a manufacturer's
speech advocating a product's sale and a consumer protection
advocate's speech criticizing the product would be deemed less
protected commercial speech.24  Under the second alternative, in
contrast, it is only speech motivated by the seller's goal of direct
financial gain through sale that falls within the supposedly "second
class" category of commercial expression.2 ' Both alternatives repre-
sent linguistically plausible definitions of the phrase. While the first
alternative is, however, at least theoretically conceivable, at no point
has the Court ever chosen to employ it. It is probably reasonable to
conclude that, at this point, the Court has unambiguously adopted the
view that commercial speech is confined to expression advocating
purchase.26
In categorizing, analyzing and critiquing the various arguments
relied upon to reject full First Amendment protection for commercial
speech, it is essential that we recognize that those scholars who
have advocated this position have done so on the assumption that
23. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 553-54 (2001) (stating courts
have recognized the "distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which
occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech"
(quoting Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562)).
24. The issue becomes significantly more problematic, of course, once the debate begins to
concern possible government regulation of commercial products or services, because at that point
the speech could arguably be deemed political in nature. This fact, however, simply underscores
the difficulty of attempting to segregate commercial speech as a self-contained category.
25. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
785 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67 (explaining that since speech is
part of the promotion of a sale it is relevant to the determination of commercial speech).
26. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 366-68 (2002).
27. It should be noted that unless otherwise specified, when I refer to commercial speech in
the course of this Article, I intend to include only truthful, non-misleading expression. There are
a number of significant arguments growing out of the question of First Amendment protection for
false or misleading commercial expression. See, e.g., Post, supra note 7, at 37-41; Martin H.
Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific Expression and the Twilight
Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1433, 1443 (1990). In prior writing, I have
argued that false commercial speech, much like most false political speech, should be measured
by the "actual malice" test of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). See
REDISH, MONEY TALKS, supra note 18, at 55-56. Thus, for reasons I have explained elsewhere, I
ultimately conclude that even false commercial speech is to be treated fungibly with false non-
commercial speech. See id. at 53-56. For purposes of intellectual simplicity, however, my
critique in this Article is aimed exclusively at arguments made for providing reduced or no First
Amendment protection for even wholly truthful commercial speech.
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commercial speech is confined to expression promoting sale.28
Indeed, in a number of instances the fact of sale promotion is central
to the argument for reduced protection.29 Thus, it should always be
kept in mind that the very same scholars who urge reduced
protection for commercial speech are at the same time proceeding on
the assumption that expression criticizing the quality, safety,
efficiency, or value of commercial products or services receives full
constitutional protection.
B. Understanding the Nature of Principled Constitutional Analysis:
The Two Levels of Normative Inquiry
Many years ago, Herbert Wechsler, in his famed article on
"neutral principles," provided the modem basis for the argument that
constitutional interpretation must, at its foundation, rest on prin-
ciple.3" Though the article clearly suffers from a number of flaws
and has been the victim of often vigorous, and sometimes misguided,
attack,3' it properly remains the starting point for any argument that
constitutional interpretation must ultimately be grounded in
principled analysis.
Anyone who seeks to defend the need for principled analysis in
constitutional interpretation, of course, bears an obligation to explain
the difference between principled and unprincipled interpretation,
which is not an easy task. Indeed, Professor Wechsler was largely
agnostic on the question of how to choose a "principled" inter-
pretation of a constitutional provision in the first place. 2 However,
Wechsler's greatest-albeit today largely ignored-contribution was
to point out what perhaps should have been (but often has not been)
obvious in any event: To satisfy the requirements of principle, a
constitutional interpretation must be applied neutrally.33 In other
28. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 19, at 3.
29. See discussion infra Part II.C. 1 .b-d.
30. Wechsler, supra note 9, at 16.
31. E.g., Arthur S. Miller & Ronald F. Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional
Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661 passim (1960); Jon 0. Newman, Between Legal Realism
and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of Institutional Values, 72 CAL. L. REV. 200, 202-08
(1984); Benjamin F. Wright, The Supreme Court Cannot Be Neutral, 40 TEX. L. REV. 599 passim
(1962).
32. See generally Wechsler, supra note 9, at 11-19 (arguing that courts should rely on
principled analysis that transcends the immediate case, but providing no criteria for courts to
follow).
33. Id. at 15.
[Vol. 41:67
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words, whatever rationale a court selects to justify its chosen
interpretive doctrine must be applied consistently in all cases; it
cannot be selectively altered in subsequent cases solely because the
court finds the outcome dictated by use of that principle to be
politically distasteful or offensive. Wechsler's insight, then, can play
a valuable role in constitutional analysis, even if one remains
uncertain of how to choose the applicable interpretive principle in the
first place. His primary concern was not with the shaping of the
principle, but in maintaining the principle's consistent application
once it has been adopted in the initial case.
In important ways, portions of the First Amendment prohibition
on viewpoint discrimination grow out of a Wechslerian concern for
principle. When a regulation of expression is justified on the ground
that the regulated expression possesses quality X, the fact that the
regulation fails to include within its prohibitory reach other
expression that also possesses quality X automatically renders the
regulation, if not unconstitutional, then at least constitutionally
suspect. This is so even if one were to assume that a regulation of all
the expression characterized by X would satisfy the First Amend-
ment. The constitutional flaw is that the regulation is irrationally
underinclusive, and therefore discriminatory.
It is important to understand that parallel underinclusiveness
analysis applies to selective expressive protection, as well as to
selective expressive suppression. Phrased in Wechslerian terms,
when the principle of First Amendment interpretation chosen by a
reviewing court as a basis for excluding the regulated expression
from the protective scope of the First Amendment simultaneously
affects other types of speech that the court in subsequent cases
chooses to protect, the court has failed to apply its interpretive
principle in a neutral manner. Of course, nothing in Wechslerian
jurisprudence would logically prevent a reviewing court from
deciding to alter its underlying interpretive principle (putting issues
of constitutional stare decisis to the side).34 Thus, the court could
now decide that it had been incorrect in its prior decision in believing
that expression is disqualified from the First Amendment's scope
because it is characterized by X. Such an alteration in principle,
34. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979-84 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Fall 2007]
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however, would logically dictate a reversal of the decision not to
extend protection to the regulated expression in the initial case; a
failure to do so would lead to swimming halfway across a river,
intellectually speaking. The court could, on the other hand, now
decide that while X is not an appropriate basis on which to determine
First Amendment protection, Y does provide such a basis, and the
speech not protected in the initial case is characterized by Y while the
speech the court chose to protect in the second case is not. If so,
however, the court would obviously have to be explicit in its change
in underlying decisional principle. Absent such an explicit change in
governing principle, exclusion of the expression in case one from the
First Amendment's scope, combined with the protective inclusion of
similarly characterized expression in case two, is inescapably
unprincipled.
When a reviewing court is guilty of such inconsistency in
application of its chosen interpretive principle, two conceivable
explanations exist: (1) the court simply fails to recognize or grasp the
inconsistency, or (2) the court is making a conscious (albeit
concealed) choice to apply its principle selectively because it dislikes
the regulated speech in the initial case but is favorably disposed to
the regulated speech in the second case. There appears to be no third
alternative. The reviewing court could, perhaps, candidly acknowl-
edge that it is refusing to protect the expression in case one, not
because of any neutrally applied precept of First Amendment
analysis but simply because it finds the substance of the speech
politically or morally offensive. For example, the court could con-
ceivably assert, quite openly, that its "principle" of First Amendment
interpretation is that the speech of Socialists, or Fascists, or
Communists or (fill in name of hated group here) is so offensive as
to exclude itself from constitutional protection.35 Applying this form
of principled analysis, the court would be quite consistent in deciding
not to protect the speech in case one but to protect the speech in case
two. Such an approach to First Amendment interpretation, however,
is impermissible. It represents not a good faith attempt to reconcile
and apply the competing historical, textual and normative factors
required by principled First Amendment analysis, but rather a thinly
veiled attempt by those in power to use the First Amendment as a
35. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 127-28 (1959).
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weapon to undermine the freedom of thought and expression
underlying that very constitutional protection.
One may better understand this interpretive dichotomy by
dissecting the reasoning that enters into the shaping of both levels of
constitutional analysis. On the first level, the interpreter is seeking to
glean an appropriate normative guide from the value or synthesis of
values underlying the First Amendment. To be sure, reasonable
people may differ over what the correct underlying value or values
actually are, or the correct translation from value to doctrine, but in
each situation the interpreter is seeking to decipher the deep
constitutional structure underlying the words of the First Amend-
ment. On the second level, the interpreter cares not at all about the
deep structural value or values underlying the protection of free
expression, but instead reflexively draws a superficial, unsupported
and manipulative equation between those values and the exclusion of
what she deems politically offensive speech. But in the end, inter-
preters operating on this narrower political level are concerned not at
all with what the First Amendment is all about. They are focused,
rather, on how to suppress the speech they find politically offensive,
and manipulatively interpret the First Amendment toward that end.
C. The Three Categories of Commercial Speech Opposition
With this structural background established, it is now appro-
priate to turn to explication of the three categories of justifications
for the extension of reduced or no protection to commercial speech.
Those three categories, it should be recalled, are (1) rationalist, (2)
intuitionist, and (3) ideological. It should be emphasized that this
categorization is solely my own. No one, to my knowledge, has ever
even attempted to categorize the anti-commercial speech arguments,
much less chosen the specific categories that I have selected. Since
none of the scholars who oppose full First Amendment protection for
commercial speech has ever expressly categorized his own argu-
ments in the manner I suggest, it is conceivable that particular
scholars will object to my classification of their work. In each case,
however, I believe that all of those opposing full commercial speech
protection fit with surprising ease into one of my three categories.
Fall 2007]
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1. Rationalist Grounds
What I describe as rationalist grounds for opposition to First
Amendment protection for commercial speech include those reasons
that purport to be based on principled interpretation of the Amend-
ment-in other words, efforts to construe and implement the values
underlying the constitutional provision. To the extent these reasons
justify exclusion of commercial speech, then, at least superficially,
they do so not because of political opposition to commercial speech,
but rather simply because commercial speech does not adequately
further First Amendment values. I have discerned six conceivable
rationalist grounds: (1) absence of relevance to the political process,
(2) motivational heartiness, (3) the speech-action dichotomy, (4) the
corporate nature of the speaker, (5) speaker self-interest, and (6)
regulatory motivation.36 Closer analysis of each of these asserted
rationalist grounds, however, readily exposes the grossly
underinclusive nature of all of them.
a. Absence of relevance to the political process
Although Professor Farber is undoubtedly incorrect when he
asserts that "[e]veryone seems to agree that political speech lies at
the core of the First Amendment's protection,"37 it is certainly true
that a number of leading First Amendment scholars have advocated
this view." If one were to define "commercial speech" as speech
concerning commercial products or services, I suppose one starting
36. Note that in shaping these rationales, I draw on the analysis first developed in my book,
Money Talks. See REDISH, MONEY TALKS, supra note 18, at 31-53.
37. Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First
Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 562 (1991). At the very least, he is incorrect to the extent I
am included among the description of "[e]veryone." See generally Martin H. Redish, The Value
of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982) [hereinafter Redish, The Value of Free Speech]
(arguing that non-political speech, like political speech, fosters self-realization value). Other
commentators who reject the view described by Farber also seem not to fall within Professor
Farber's description of "[e]veryone." See generally C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 966 (1978) ("Speech is protected not as a
means to a collective good but because of the value of speech conduct to the individual.");
Kozinski & Banner, supra note 18 (arguing that the commercial/non-commercial distinction
"makes no sense").
38. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF
GOVERNMENT 93-94 (Lawbook Exchange Ltd 2001) (1948) (arguing that the First Amendment
only protects "speech which bears, directly or indirectly, upon issues with which voters have to
deal--only, therefore, to the consideration of matters of public interest"); Robert Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 27-28 (1971) (advocating
constitutional protection only to expressly political speech).
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from the premise that the First Amendment is primarily or
exclusively designed to protect speech relevant to the political
process would logically conclude that commercial speech is
deserving of little or no First Amendment protection. I have attacked
this view as flawed because it fails to determine the normative
reasons our system would choose democracy in the first place.39
Examination of that question, I have asserted, establishes that speech
concerning commercial products and services can facilitate private
self-government in much the same way that political speech fosters
collective self-government.4" Both private and collective self-
government are grounded in identical normative concerns about self-
development and self-determination.4 Therefore, I have concluded
that it makes absolutely no sense to protect speech relevant to a
situation where the individual has a minuscule fraction of a say in the
outcome while simultaneously refusing to protect speech that will
facilitate choices by the private individual that are solely her own.42
All of this is rendered completely moot, however, once one
chooses to define commercial speech not in terms of its subject, but
rather exclusively in terms of the motivation of the speaker. If, as
the Supreme Court currently maintains,43 commercial speech refers
only to speech that advocates purchase, there exists a great deal of
expression concerning commercial goods and services that is not
relegated to the second class status given to commercial advertising.
The magazine Consumer Reports, as well as consumer advocate
groups, talk predominantly, if not exclusively, about the relative
merits of countless commercial goods and services.
It might be argued that, unlike the expression of the commercial
advertisers, speech of Consumer Reports and consumer advocate
groups is presumably objective. But that fact, even if assumed to be
39. See REDISH, MONEY TALKS, supra note 18, at 22-29.
40. Id.
41. See MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 19-29
(1984).
42. See id. At the live symposium, Professor Shifftin asserted that the key to the democratic
process is participation, rather than self-government. Steven Shiffrin, Remarks at the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review Symposium: Commercial Speech: Past, Present & Future (Feb. 24,
2007) [hereinafter Shiffrin, Symposium Remarks]. However, it is difficult for me to comprehend
what possible value participation could have completely divorced from the interest in self-
determination. Participation is a rather hollow activity, absent some say in the final choice.
43. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983); see supra
note 12 and accompanying text.
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accurate, surely has nothing to do with the characterization of the
expression as political or non-political. Thus, it is at least arguable
that a preference for political speech protection could logically lead
to reduced protection, or even an absence of protection, for speech
about the merits of commercial products and services." It would,
44. Even this assertion is questionable, since it assumes that somehow we are able to
separate expression into neat, severable units in which we can easily distinguish between political
and commercial speech. This ignores the fact that expression about commercial products and
services often simultaneously implicates traditionally protected expressive categories such as
political or scientific speech.
In his response to this Article, Professor Weinstein suggests that while the First
Amendment is appropriately deemed to be about speech concerning the political process, even
non-political information may be thought of as having a distinct (if secondary) informational
value. James Weinstein, Fools, Knaves & the Production of Commercial Speech: A Response to
Professor Redish, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 133, 144-52 (2007). For that reason, Consumer Reports
may deserve constitutional protection because of the benefit of the information it supplies about
commercial products and services. This reasoning is curious, since the very premise of his First
Amendment theory is that it is only speech that contributes to public discourse that furthers the
First Amendment's core constitutional value. But if this is true, how can he conclusively assert
that in some instances, even purely non-political expression is deserving of protection? He has
failed to explain why information unrelated to public discourse should receive First Amendment
protection, when his rationale for First Amendment protection focuses primarily on the value of
public discourse. Moreover, if we are to assume that such expression untied to public discourse
is, in fact, deserving of protection, how do we know that the level of protection it deserves is less
than that deserved by public discourse? Why is only public discourse relevant to the core value
of free expression? Professor Weinstein seems merely to assume both points, without the
slightest explanatory rationale for either. In addition, if we are to grant Weinstein both of his
wholly unsupported postulates-i.e., that non-public discourse informational speech is worthy of
constitutional protection, but that level of protection is for some reason less than that given to
public discourse-how can he possibly make the wholly unsupported ex ante empirical
assumption that Consumer Reports has informational value beyond that of commercial
advertising? At the very least, wouldn't he logically need to permit a showing of regulated
advertising's informational value in the individual case?
Finally, if Professor Weinstein is so willing to excise non-informational or incomplete
non-political speech from the First Amendment's protective scope, one might reasonably ask why
even speech that contributes to public discourse is not measured by the same standards. His
response, apparently, is that the value of political speech is not its informational benefit but rather
some sort of personal benefit to the speaker that comes from the very act of participation. But if
this is so, a number of questions arise. First, one may wonder why he so quickly provides
secondary status to the constitutional value of political information to the voter. Second, one may
also wonder why he assumes-once again, without the slightest empirical support-that the
commercial speaker is more likely than the political speaker to be motivated by personal gain,
rather than by a desire to obtain the benefits that flow exclusively from the very act of
participation. The First Amendment, after all, has hardly been deemed the preserve of those on
the level of Mother Theresa. Underscoring the mystery of Weinstein's assumption is the fact that
he no doubt extends full First Amendment protection to large corporate enterprises who publish
newspapers and political magazines. Presumably their motivation is not participation in public
discourse as much as it is corporate profit. As a concluding aside, I am really curious what
implications Weinstein's political participation theory has for speech that is characterized as
literature, art, music and science. If he would, in fact, extend full protection to them, one may
reasonably wonder why commercial speech is somehow less deserving of protection, since none
of them directly implicates the democratic process. If, on the other hand, he would not extend
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however, amount to a total non sequitur to suggest that because we
give primacy to political speech, we should reduce protection for
commercial advertising but not for non-promotional comments about
commercial products and services. Neither has any more to do with
the political process than the other. Thus, reliance on a political
speech preference as a principled basis for rejecting protection for
commercial advertising breaks down. It is easily revealed to be an
irrationally underinclusive, and therefore unprincipled, ground for
distinguishing commercial from non-commercial expression for
purposes of First Amendment protection.
b. Motivational heartiness
In choosing to extend substantial constitutional protection to
commercial speech for the first time, the Virginia Board Court
emphasized that there existed "commonsense differences" between
commercial speech and traditionally protected expression.45 Chief
among these differences is that "[s]ince advertising is the sine qua
non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being
chilled by proper regulation."46 The existence of the profit motive, in
other words, provides a heartiness to commercial speech that makes
it more resistant to chilling regulation. Putting the same point in the
terms of public choice theory, Professor Farber has suggested that
commercial speech is "[a]t the periphery" of the First Amendment,47
because "[c]ommercial speech ... [more] closely resembles a private
good [than does political speech]. Most of the benefit of product
advertising is captured by the producer itself in the form of increased
sales. Consequently, we would not expect severe underproduction of
commercial speech."4
It is conceivable that if accepted as a rationale for reduced
protection of commercial speech, the argument grounded in
motivational heartiness would, in fact, justify the drawing of a
distinction between direct commercial promotion of sale, on the one
literature, art, music and science full protection, it is likely that most reasonable observers would
deem his approach far too narrow in its reach.
45. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772
n.24 (1976).
46. Id.
47. Farber, supra note 37, at 562.
48. Id. at 565 (footnote omitted).
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hand, and a Consumer Reports discussion of products, on the other.
As Professor Farber asserts, "Product information distributed by a
third party produces benefits that are captured by persons other than
the speaker. The speaker, therefore, has an inadequate motivation to
produce this information."49 One response to Farber's point is that
Consumer Reports does have an economic incentive to produce and
distribute its information, for the simple reason that it is able to sell
its magazines because of that information. It is arguable, perhaps,
that unlike the manufacturer or dealer, Consumer Reports does not
benefit economically-at least directly-by listener acceptance of,
and action upon, its expression, although if listeners or readers do not
accept what Consumer Reports says, presumably they will not buy
its publication and the publishers will lose money. The problems
with this "motivational heartiness" rationale, however, are far more
significant than this single concern.
In different ways, this rationale for refusing to protect speech
manages to be simultaneously overinclusive and underinclusive. It is
overinclusive, in that it ignores vitally important differences among
different forms of expressive regulation. When the governmental
regulation is partial, it is at least conceivable that the motivational
heartiness rationale is relevant. Thus, it could be argued (albeit
incorrectly, I believe) that where government prohibits only false
commercial speech-which itself is presumed to fall outside the First
Amendment's protective scope-the spillover chilling effect on
protected truthful commercial speech is diluted by the competing
motivation of speaker self-interest. The speaker's desire to commu-
nicate truthful information would continue to exist despite the
possible fear that what it deems truthful will subsequently be
punished as false. But when the governmental regulation of expres-
sion is total, meaning that it has simply shut down all forms of that
type of communication, the motivational heartiness rationale does
not make the slightest bit of sense. Where government has sup-
pressed all of a particular form of expression, what possible
difference does it make that the would-be speaker's motivation to
speak remains strong due to self-interest? Under such circumstances,
no matter how motivated the speaker may be, he is denied the right
or opportunity to speak. Here, the motivational heartiness rationale
49. Id. at 566.
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amounts to a complete non sequitur. The essence of that argument in
this context would necessarily be that it does not matter that the
speaker has been completely prohibited from conveying truthful
information, because he continues to have the motivation to
disseminate truthful information. But the conclusion in no way
logically flows from the premise. To the contrary: to state the propo-
sition is to underscore its incoherence. Nor is it the case that the
overwhelming number of commercial speech regulations are aimed
only at false or misleading commercial information." Thus, at the
very least those reflexively relying on the motivational heartiness
rationale as a justification for reducing commercial speech protection
need to be far more selective as to the nature of the expressive
regulation being justified.
It actually matters little how selective supporters of this rationale
are in choosing among types of expressive regulation, however,
because the rationale's logic is fatally underinclusive in the scope of
speakers penalized by its reach. It is true, as Professor Farber and
others have suggested, that commercial advertisers have an
enormous motivation, grounded in stark economic self-interest, to
communicate with and persuade potential purchasers." But it is
surely not difficult to think of numerous other groups of speakers
who fit the same description. Candidates for political office have an
enormous motivation, grounded in self-interest, both to communicate
and to persuade. Perhaps one could respond that while this is
possible, it is also conceivable that the candidate could be motivated
by more public-oriented goals. Yet, no one can know this ex ante, in
the particular case. We nevertheless extend full protection to all
candidate speech. Moreover, one can also hypothesize that there are
businesses motivated simultaneously by goals of personal economic
gain and public interest. In any event, one can hypothesize
numerous categories of speakers who are obviously and unam-
biguously motivated by personal gain, yet whose speech unques-
tionably receives full First Amendment protection: welfare mothers
50. Indeed, one can see this simply by a casual examination of the Supreme Court's
commercial speech decisions. In virtually none of them was the primary or exclusive subject of
regulation false or misleading commercial speech. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr.,
535 U.S. 357, 368 (2002) (prohibition on advertising of compound drugs); Lorillard Tobacco Co.
v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001) (restrictions on tobacco advertising); Greater New Orleans
Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 185 (1999) (restrictions on advertising of gambling).
51. Farber, supra note 37, at 565.
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picketing for increased benefits, anti-taxation groups, labor unions,
and political lobbying groups are illustrative.
c. The speech-action dichotomy
Perhaps the Court's focus on the proposal of a commercial
transaction as the defining element of less protected commercial
speech can be grounded in the well-established speech-action
dichotomy. Both textually and theoretically, the First Amendment
protects speech, not actions. To the extent expression promoting
commercial transactions is "linked inextricably" to the commercial
transactions themselves, arguably the speech collapses into the non-
expressive commercial transaction. As a result, its status as pro-
tected speech is at least diluted, if not completely revoked.
At most, this reasoning could have relevance to promotion at the
point of sale. It is only at the point of sale that commercial advocacy
is, even arguably, so temporally linked to the acts of purchase and
sale that it can realistically be deemed an element of these acts.
Moreover, to suggest that speech that advocates action is auto-
matically rendered the equivalent of action would defy both
conceptual reality and at least seventy years of the Supreme Court's
First Amendment jurisprudence. 2 The Court has long held that
many forms of advocacy of conduct receive full First Amendment
protection, even though the advocated conduct is itself unlawful. 3
For that reason, speech that advocates action is no less classifiable as
"speech" for purposes of First Amendment protection. Indeed,
speech advocating some alteration in listener behavior is in many
ways at the core of the constitutional protection, which recognizes
the inherent intersection between expression and political choice.
Thus, the speech-action dichotomy fails to justify a categorical
distinction between commercial and non-commercial expression.
d. The corporate nature of the speaker
One could conceivably reject protection for commercial speech
due to the nature of the speaker. The speaker proposing a
commercial transaction is invariably a profit-making corporation, an
52. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (explaining that unlawful
advocacy can be suppressed only when it gives rise to a clear and present danger of illegal harn).
53. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,448-49 (1969) (per curiam).
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artificial legal creation of the state whose sole reason for existence is
profit maximization. Professor Baker has argued that because free
speech necessarily implicates the exercise of free will, the expression
of corporations-which is nothing more than the reflexive, robotic
attempt to increase profits-cannot qualify for protection. 4 For this
reason, Professor Baker would deny protection not only to
commercial speech, but also to purely political speech uttered by
corporations.5
I have long believed that Professor Baker's reasoning is fatally
flawed because he refuses to acknowledge the relevance of the free
speech benefits that may flow to the listener or reader from reading
or hearing speech emanating from corporations, either commercial or
political. 6 If one assumes that the values of free speech can be
fostered by the receipt, as well as by the communication, of
expression,57 then it should logically make no difference whether the
speaker itself deserves the benefits of the constitutional protection. I
have further argued that Baker's approach views the corporation in
too truncated a fashion, because it ignores the reason that free willed
individuals choose to form a corporation in the first place. The
modem corporation developed most completely during the time of
Andrew Jackson's administration, as a means by which the common
person could compete with the propertied upper classes of the
Northeast. Thus, resort to the corporate form can be viewed as a
type of "catalytic self-realization" that facilitates individuals' efforts
to realize both their goals and their potential. 8 But even if one were
to suspend disbelief and accept Baker's dubious logic, his argument
remains grossly underinclusive as a justification for a surgical
excision of commercial speech from the First Amendment's
protective scope. The institutional media-from The New York
Times to the National Enquirer-are as much profit-making
corporations as is any commercial advertiser. Every publishing
54. Baker, supra note 6, at 652.
55. Id.
56. See Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good for General Motors:
Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 235-36
(1997).
57. The theory that free speech values should be viewed from a listener's perspective is
associated primarily with the writing of Alexander Meiklejohn. See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra
note 38, at 60.
58. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 56, at 237.
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decision they make is therefore presumably as motivated by profit
maximization as are those of non-media corporations.
There appear to exist several possible responses to my
underinclusiveness argument. First, Professor Baker has asserted a
distinction grounded in the First Amendment's separate consti-
tutional protection for freedom of the press. 9 Because the corporate
media are appropriately classified as "press," he argues, they are to
be treated differently, for protective purposes, from non-media
speakers." Thus, the exclusion of robotic profit maximizers from the
First Amendment is apparently to be confined to "speakers," rather
than to "press."
There is much that is troubling in Baker's reasoning. First,
historical support for Baker's grounding of his asserted distinction in
framers' intent is weak for two reasons. Initially, one can
appropriately question the interpretive legitimacy of any form of
inquiry into original intent,6' and it is only if one accepts the validity
of original intent as a form of constitutional interpretation that
Baker's argument could even conceivably have relevance. Professor
Baker himself appears wholly unconcerned with original intent when
it comes to the Speech Clause. More importantly, his argument fails
because it amounts to an anachronism: At the time of the framing,
there existed no corporate, profit-making institutional press in the
sense that it exists today.62 It therefore makes no sense to impute to
the framers the intent to exclude corporate speakers, but not the
corporate press from the scope of the First Amendment. Secondly, it
would have been all but impossible at the time-and, indeed,
today-to distinguish the institutional press from the "non-
59. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
60. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 225-49 (1989).
61. Martin H. Redish, Good Behavior, Judicial Independence, and the Foundations of
American Constitutionalism, 116 YALE L.J. 139, 146-47 (2006); see also Robert W. Bennett,
Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 445, 449 (1984).
62. According to Professor Hovenkamp,
The two greatest classical legal institutions in the United States-the modem business
corporation and the constitutional doctrine of substantive due process-are both
distinctively Jacksonian products. The modem business corporation had its origin in
the general corporation acts, one of the most important legal accomplishments of a
regime bent on democratizing and deregulating American business.
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 2 (1991). Thus, the




institutional" press, if one were even able to persuasively
hypothesize such a distinction on a conceptual level in the first place.
Third, it is difficult to understand why, purely as a normative matter,
one would choose to give greater protection to the institutional
corporate press than to other more random printed forms of
expression. Inferring such a distinction from the First Amendment
would effectively transform that provision into one big anti-
competitive antitrust violation-hardly a legitimate goal of the
constitutional protection of expression.
Perhaps one could respond that it is necessary to provide the
institutional press with greater protection, simply to assure the press'
performance of its vital "checking function," by which it exposes-
and thereby limits-governmental excess and abuse.63  But while
checking governmental abuse is surely a worthy aim of the First
Amendment, it would make no sense to confine performance of that
function to some "in group" of established, institutional corporate
media. One need point only to The New York Times's pathetic
performance as a check on the administration's now-disproven
charges of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq to see that the
institutional press is often far more willing to jump into bed with
government than it is to check it.64 It makes sense, therefore, to view
the scope of the press protection broadly, rather than narrowly.
Most devastating to Baker's effort to rationalize his corporate
press/non-press distinction is the simple fact that it is, at its
foundation, wholly illogical. If the robotic goal of profit maximi-
zation is somehow assumed to justify exclusion from the First
Amendment's scope when non-institutional press is involved-a
conclusion that, it should be recalled, I wholly reject-then
presumably it is the absence of speaker free will that justifies such
exclusion. If the institutional press is made up of profit maximizing
corporations, then they, too, must be motivated solely by robotic
profit maximization-the very fact relied upon to justify exclusion of
corporate speakers in the first place! Baker, then, needs to make up
his mind: Does the existence of a goal of robotic profit maximization
63. See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 449, 480 (1985).
64. See, e.g., Judith Miller, Defectors Bolster U.S. Case Against Iraq, Officials Say, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2003, at Al 1; Judith Miller, Disarming Saddam Hussein: Teams of Experts to
Hunt Iraq Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2003, at Al.
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logically lead to speaker exclusion from the First Amendment's
scope, or does it not? If it does, then he logically must also exclude
the corporate press. If it does not, then he cannot automatically
exclude expression of the non-press corporation. Reliance on the
existence of a separate press clause, then, provides him no outlet. If
the existence of a rigid goal of profit maximization is consistent with
the notion of constitutional protection for communication in the press
context, it logically follows that the values of the First Amendment
can co-exist with such profit maximizing motivation. But if that is
true, then one cannot rationally exclude constitutional protection for
corporate speech solely on the grounds that it is robotically profit-
maximizing.
Yet one could possibly point to other asserted distinctions
between commercial advertisers and the institutional press besides a
specious, straw-grabbing reliance on an anachronistic and illogical
press/non-press distinction. It could also be argued, for example,
that one does not necessarily know what positions will be taken in
the institutional press on issues of public importance. In contrast,
one knows for certain, ex ante, that a commercial advertiser will
promote purchase. One could perhaps reason that it is this certainty
that distinguishes commercial speech from the expression of the
corporate press. But this argument amounts to nothing more than
condemnation-and exclusion-of a speaker because she is an
advocate. We know, ex ante, that a lawyer arguing on behalf of a
client will take a position that, in one way or another, supports that
client's interests, not necessarily because the lawyer agrees
normatively with that position, but because that is the lawyer's role
within the adversary system.65 Surely, it does not logically follow
that what the lawyer says is inherently unpersuasive or suspect. The
same is true for countless non-commercial advocates whose views
and positions are quite obviously predetermined by self-interest.66
Again, neither Baker nor virtually any other critic of commercial
speech protection chooses for that reason to exclude the expression
of those speakers from the First Amendment's protection.
65. Martin H. Redish, The Adversary System, Democratic Theory, and the Constitutional
Role of Self-Interest: The Tobacco Wars, 1953-1971, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 362-63 (2001)
[hereinafter Redish, Adversary System].
66. See supra note 21.
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One might also point to the public interest that exists in the
substance of what the institutional media report on, which is to be
contrasted to the far narrower concerns of the commercial advertiser.
But this argument, too, is fatally underinclusive, as long as one
assumes that Consumer Reports, which deals with no issue beyond
those of the merits of commercial products and services, is to receive
full constitutional protection.
It could be argued that the right being asserted is not that of the
corporate press, but rather of the reporter or writer who works for the
corporation. But what if, as common sense tells us is likely often the
case, the reporter writes what the corporation wants her to write? 67
At the very least, we can be reasonably assured that in most cases,
the reporter writes nothing that the corporation does not wish to be
printed. In any event, no one has even suggested that the press' First
Amendment right in any way turns on the relationship between
writer and corporate publisher in an individual case. And it cannot
be forgotten that the corporate publisher was able to choose its
reporters in the first place. Thus, as long as it is the corporate
publisher, rather than the writer himself, who is the subject of the
infringement, this factor cannot reasonably distinguish the profit
motivation of the corporate institutional press from that of the
commercial advertiser.
Finally, the ultimate refuge of one who has no other argument to
make is to fall back on mindless adherence to tradition. The
institutional press receives full protection, despite its inexorable
drive to maximize profits, for no reason other than in American
tradition it has been deemed to receive it, while commercial speech
has not. But this form of "proof by adverse possession" makes little
sense. Also part of our nation's "tradition," tragically, were slavery,
Jim Crow laws, the near genocide of the Native American
population, and the (shockingly recent) confine-ment of American
citizens for no reason other than their national origin during World
War II. Surely, not every part of our tradition is to be deemed
preserved by constitutional value. If one can defend the unprincipled
67. See Ronnie Dugger, The Corporate Domination of Journalism, in THE BUSINESS OF
JOURNALISM 27, 27, 34-35 (William Serrin ed., 2000) ("Corporate censorship now shapes the
whole mainstream media process .... The reporter, for the dissemination of whose honest work
the press is supposed to be free, is subordinated now to the nature of the corporation itself and to
the mass-audience requirements, ideological restraints, profit-making imperatives ... of those
same advertising and entertainment corporations.").
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distinction between First Amendment protection for the corporate
press on the one hand and the commercial advertiser on the other
solely on grounds of tradition, one has effectively conceded the
argument.
e. Speaker self-interest
In some ways, the argument grounded in speaker self-interest
has already been alluded to as part of the discussion of the possible
distinctions between commercial advertising and the corporate
media.68 In a broader sense, however, the argument potentially
stands on a separate footing as an independent basis for excluding
commercial speech from the First Amendment's protective reach.
No commercial advertiser, it may be safely presumed, is likely to
highlight the flaws or deficiencies in its product or the comparative
advantages of a competitor's product. In this way, it might be argued
that commercial speech is inherently misleading because of its
strategic and selective incompleteness.69
This argument is transparently underinclusive in its reach.
Surely, strategic and selective advocacy is by no means confined to
commercial advertising. To the contrary, casual experience and
common sense tell us that there is preciously little fully protected
expression that could properly be labeled "objective." Countless
speakers, whether in the political, academic, or social worlds, have
an underlying agenda when they speak. This invariably leads them
to selectively omit damaging information from the content of their
argument. This is as true of political interest groups as it is of
political candidates. For example, the National Rifle Association is
no more likely to promote in its literature the number of people killed
annually in gun accidents than gun control advocates are likely to
highlight the number of crimes prevented due to gun ownership.
Yet, somehow, this fact never leads the very same scholars who
criticize protection of commercial speech to argue for reduced
protection for the speech of interest groups or political candidates.
Instead, we accept as a given that individuals and associations have a
68. See discussion supra Part I.C.l.d.
69. This argument, it should be noted, is distinct from an argument that posits that while
commercial speech is deserving of First Amendment protection in the abstract, false and
misleading commercial speech is not deserving of such protection. This argument, in contrast,
assumes the inherently misleading nature of commercial speech because of its inherent advocacy.
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full constitutional right to promote their goals-often involving
personal economic gain"-° through the use of expression as a means
of persuading listeners, readers and viewers to accept their positions.
Yet, this is, of course, exactly what commercial advertisers are
doing.7
f Regulatory motivation
The final conceivably principled rationale for the reduction in or
exclusion of commercial speech from the First Amendment is what I
label "regulatory motivation." Simply put, the argument is that when
political speech is regulated, there exists an appropriate degree of
mistrust of and skepticism about the motivation of the regulator.
Such skepticism flows from the inherent incentive of those in power
to suppress the expression of their out-of-power rivals. This fact
gives rise to the need for a reviewing court to intervene more
aggressively to counter the incentive to over-regulate and to protect
free speech interests."
This reasoning resonates with the inherent skepticism that led
the framers to adopt systems of separation of powers, federalism, and
checks and balances when they promulgated the Constitution.73
Perhaps "if angels were to govern," the authors of the Federalist
Papers reasoned, there would be no need for such protections.74
Sadly, the eminent drafters of those documents were forced to
recognize that those who do govern are likely to be far from
angelic."
70. See discussion supra Part II.C.1 .b.
71. As previously noted, acceptance of the appropriateness of strategic incompleteness in
expression provides the foundation for our commitment to the adversary system. See discussion
supra Parts II.C. l.d-e. See generally Redish, Adversary System, supra note 65 (discussing the
concept of adversary theory in the context of free speech and due process).
72. Puzzlingly, this inherent incentive to suppress the competition appears to have been
largely ignored by certain members of the Supreme Court in the area of campaign finance
regulation. Justice Breyer, for example, has urged greater-than-normal deference to legislative
choices in campaign finance regulation, due to the supposed "expertise" of a governing legislative
body. See Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2492 (2006); McConnell v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003). He does so, despite the obvious fact that sitting legislators
have an inherent interest in confining the ability of opponents to equalize the advantages
traditionally associated with incumbency.
73. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; id. art. III, § 2; id. art. V.
74. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 118 (James Madison) (J. & A. McLean ed., 1788).
75. See id. See generally Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern
The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449 (1991)
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Whether this reasoning justifies reduced or excluded protection
for commercial speech, however, is a very different matter, for at
least two reasons. First, the insights of public choice literature tell us
that the legislative regulatory process is fraught with dangers of rent-
seeking or improper influence by special interests and private
parties.76 There is no reason to believe that these dangers are any less
when the subject of regulation is commercial, rather than political,
behavior. Indeed, those with financial resources sufficient to
influence political decision making are often commercial operators
who are likely to be disposed toward suppression of their compe-
tition. Suppression of the speech of their competitors is often likely
to be as effective, and far more subtle, than direct regulation of
competitors' commercial behavior. To point to one of many
conceivable examples, the drug industry could conceivably seek to
influence the legislative process for the purpose of suppressing
advertising of generic, compound, or homeopathic competitors.
There is, then, no ex ante basis on which to assume the good faith or
neutrality of legislative regulators in the regulation of commercial
activity.
The same skepticism might also affect administrative regulation.
Scholars have often pointed to the danger of "captured agencies," in
which regulators travel back and forth between governmental
agencies and the industries they regulate.7 This danger, under
certain circumstances, could negatively affect competitors of those
regulated. The problem for a reviewing court, of course, is that it is
both difficult and unseemly to attempt to ferret out such pathological
motivation in a particular case. It is, therefore, appropriate to
generically presume the danger of regulatory abuse when
commercial speech is the subject of regulation, much as we do when
political speech is the subject of regulation.
(discussing the doctrine of separation of powers and the various models used to resolve separation
of powers disputes).
76. See generally Steven Kelman, "Public Choice" and Public Spirit, 87 PUB. INT. 80
(1987) (arguing that the practice of public choice itself is essentially immoral); Cass Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988) (advocating that a republican
approach to the First Amendment offers reasons to reform many areas of modem law); Cass
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985) (suggesting that
courts should use principles of republicanism to assess political processes).
77. See, e.g., THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE
UNITED STATES 77-78 (2d ed. 1979).
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Moreover, exclusive focus on the danger of pathological
regulatory motive unduly truncates both First Amendment interests
and the threat posed to them by regulation, particularly of the
administrative variety. As I have argued in another context,
regulatory bodies exist for the very purpose of regulating.78 It is all
but inconceivable, then, that they can be presumed to provide
protection for free speech interests which stand as potential obstacles
to regulation with the appropriate level of intensity. It is not
uncommon for regulators to focus their concern on a paternalistic
desire to protect individuals by selectively suppressing promotion of
sale of legal products.79 This is so, even if we assume no ulterior or
pathological regulatory motivation. It is simply a matter of the
cognitive dissonance that inheres in holding the position in the first
place. This danger exists just as much when the subject of regulation
is commercial speech as when it is non-commercial speech.
Finally, reliance on a focus on potential pathological regulatory
motivation as a justification for drawing a protective distinction
between commercial and non-commercial expression is fatally
underinclusive for yet another reason. Even were one to assume, for
purposes of argument, that the danger of regulatory pathology exists
for political speech regulation but not for commercial speech
regulation, it would remain unclear why Consumer Reports would
receive full First Amendment protection. Presumably, there is at
least as small a danger of regulatory pathology when objective
comments on commercial products and services are made as when
commercial advocacy is regulated. Thus, as is the case for all of the
conceivable "rationalist" defenses of reduced protection for
commercial speech, the regulatory motivation argument is fatally
underinclusive. °
78. See Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First
Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 76 (1984) ("Nonjudicial administrative regulators of
expression exist for the sole purpose of regulating; that is their raison d'etre."); see also Thomas
I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 659 (1955)
("The function of the censor is to censor. He has a professional interest in finding things to
suppress.").
79. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995) (finding a law that
prohibits beer labels from displaying alcohol content violates the First Amendment).
80. It was suggested at the live symposium of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review that
even if I were correct in my assertion that none of these six posited justifications provides rational
support for reduced protection for commercial speech, the six of them combined may do so.
Remarks at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Symposium: Commercial Speech: Past,
Present & Future (Feb. 24, 2007). I have a great deal of trouble understanding this argument;
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2. "Intuitionist" Grounds
First Amendment scholarship is often characterized by what
could best be described as an "anti-rationalist" school of thought.8'
Though some scholars somehow manage to fit themselves into both
rationalist and anti-rationalist camps, 2 for the most part, acceptance
of this anti-rationalism allows its advocate to reach decisions about
the scope of First Amendment protection without risking a headache
due to over-thinking. Instead of worrying about how to deal with
annoying logical inconsistencies in their conclusions, they choose to
defend their decisions on grounds that are fundamentally right-
brained and, therefore, presumably immune to rationalist attack.
These intuitionist scholars are, in other words, focused exclusively
on the intuitive appeal of the result of the extension or non-extension
of First Amendment protection to a particular hypothetical situation.
Thus, Professors Farber and Frickey imply the preposterousness
of suggesting a constitutional equivalence between political speech
and an advertisement for soap, without enlightening us as to why,
exactly, no equivalence can be drawn. 3 Professors Jackson and
Jeffries assert-without so much as the slightest grounding in
rational thought-that whatever the First Amendment protects, it
surely fails to protect "a seller hawking his wares."84 Phrased in such
a way, I suppose it does-superficially, at least-seem intuitively
nonsensical to provide full constitutional protection to such fluff as
that. But when one attempts to deconstruct their reasoning, one finds
little more than hyperbolic pejorative in support of their sweeping
adding six losing lottery tickets together does not equal one winning lottery ticket. I have
demonstrated that each, on its own terms, is false, illogical, inconsistent, or otherwise invalid. It
is therefore difficult to see how each could be transformed into a necessary-but-insufficient
condition for the proposition that commercial speech is undeserving of protection.
81. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First
Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1639-56 (1987).
82. Professor Farber's scholarship, for example, has included both rationalist and anti-
rationalist arguments for reduced protection of commercial speech. As for rationalist arguments,
see Farber, supra note 37, at 562-68, wherein he asserts a public choice version of what I have
labeled a motivational heartiness argument. See discussion supra Part II.C. 1.b. On the other
hand, Professor Farber's work on commercial speech (co-authored with Professor Frickey) is
characterized by reliance on a quasi-intuitionist form of "practical reason" and a rejection of
heavily rationalist arguments in support of commercial speech protection. See Farber & Frickey,
supra note 81, at 1639-56.
83. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 81, at 1622.
84. Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due
Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 2-6 (1979).
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and summary exclusion of commercial speech from the First
Amendment's scope.
Professor Emerson asserted many years ago that commercial
speech concerns the field of property rights, rather than those
centered on expression.85 But like Farber and Frickey and Jackson
and Jeffries, Emerson fails to make even the slightest effort to
explain why this is so, or, for that matter, why the two are somehow
assumed to be mutually exclusive in the first place, even if he is
correct in his assertion that commercial speech implicates the system
of property rights. But all of these free speech commentators are
freed from so burdensome a task as engaging in careful, reasoned,
and logically consistent explication of their conclusions. Each of
them, in one way or another, is (if only implicitly) employing a form
of First Amendment intuitionism, 6 which, it appears, is simply
another word for "conclusory."
I truly envy those scholars who feel sufficiently comfortable
with their total abandonment of the obligations of reason and logical
consistency so as to develop official labels for their refusal to
recognize and assume the task of reasoned analysis, traditionally
deemed inherent in the scholarly endeavor. The strategy, I fully
concede, is brilliant. How, after all, can one respond to a reliance on
"intuitionism"? How can one possibly prove it wrong? Measured by
an intuitionist perspective, a conclusion's truth is established
automatically by its assertion. This is so, because the assertion
unquestionably represents the speaker's intuition as a definitional
matter. A decision based on constitutional intuition, then, can never
be "wrong."
Whether practical reason demands more intellectual rigor than
intuitionism provides appears to be the subject of debate. Farber and
Frickey, for example, have suggested that it does. Yet, their own
suggested definition of practical reason certainly fails to instill
confidence in their ability to translate the phrase's seemingly vague
terms into something capable of providing meaningful guidance as to
what is and is not appropriate. Farber and Frickey suggest "an
85. EMERSON, supra note 17, at 414-17, 447.
86. Professor Shiffrin has explicitly employed the term "intuitionism" to describe his
approach to First Amendment interpretation. See Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and
Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV.
1212, 1254 (1984).
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alternative view of the [F]irst [A]mendment's normative status.
Rather than thinking of free speech as one level in a hierarchy of
values, it may be better to think of it as part of a web of mutually
reinforcing values."87 The problem they see with more conceptually
foundational, logically applied theories is that these approaches often
lead inexorably to "highly dubious applications, which the theorist
presents as logically inescapable inferences from his premise.""
They conclude that "[w]hen a concrete application of grand theory
cannot be squared with our complex, situationally sensitive web of
beliefs, it is the former that is likely to give way."89
If all Farber and Frickey are saying is that pragmatic
considerations must at some point be taken into account in shaping
First Amendment jurisprudence, I certainly do not disagree. But
pragmatic considerations, too, can and should be developed first on a
generalized basis as part and parcel of, or at least a gloss on, the
general theory, and then applied to specific fact situations as a
transparent potential qualifier or limitation on the remaining part of
the theory. Thus, my self-realization theory is expressly restrained
by recognition of the need to take into account cases in which there
exists a compelling need to prevent harm (narrowly defined), usually
physical harm. But surely inclusion of this limited pragmatic
gloss-itself appropriately disciplined by its own sets of internally
principled restrictionsg--is a far cry from the vague and malleable
reference to a "complex, situationally sensitive web of beliefs" to
which Farber and Frickey cryptically refer.9
Farber and Frickey assert that all forms of modem practical
reason
share some fundamental characteristics. Among them are a
concern for history and context; a desire to avoid
abstracting away the human component in judicial
decisionmaking; an appreciation of the complexity of life;
some faith in dialogue and deliberation; a tolerance for
87. Farber & Frickey, supra note 81, at 1640.
88. Id. at 1641.
89. Id.
90. See generally Martin H. Redish, Unlawful Advocacy and Free Speech Theory:
Rethinking the Lessons of the McCarthy Era, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 9 (2004) (exploring contexts in
which danger of harm should be found to restrict speech rights).
91. Farber& Frickey,supra note 81, at 1641.
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ambiguity, accommodation, and tentativeness, but a
skepticism of rigid dichotomies; and an overall humility.92
Practical reason, they readily concede,
is unruly. It specifies no certain starting point, follows no
predestined path, may frolic as well as detour, and cannot
rise above the abilities of its users. Indeed, the indeter-
minacy of practical reasoning might suggest that it cannot
achieve the status of a theory at all. Like 'prudence' and
'wisdom' in everyday affairs, legal practical reasoning is
explained better by example than by abstract methodo-
logical prescriptions . . . . The absence of a formula for
practical reasoning is inherent in the enterprise . . .9
What seems to be missing from this discussion is any effort to
explain how one actually goes about attempting to resolve a specific
case on the basis of practical reason. In contrast to principled
decision making, practical reason appears to rely on a far cruder
resort to a pre-existing set of widely shared prejudices and normative
social instincts, untied to any effort to resolve individual cases by
reliance on broader and deeper forms of constitutional value
development, determined before examination of the specific
situational context. Strongest evidence of this ominous absence of
grounding in some consistently applied set of non-contextual values
is Farber and Frickey's total failure to explain why "selling soap" is
less deserving of First Amendment protection than other, more
traditionally protected types of expression.94 Yet they are more than
willing to criticize my concededly counterintuitive suggestion (to
many, at least) that no principled basis, grounded in accepted and
transparent principles of First Amendment theory, can justify a
gradation of protection between the two subjects of expression.95
Instead of resorting to so burdensome and unpleasant a theoretical
and logical inquiry, Farber and Frickey appear to rely on a kind of
intuitive situational judgment, largely inexplicable beyond the
conclusory expression of a deep-seated feeling that somehow the two
situations must be treated differently. This intuitive judgment,
92. Id. at 1646.
93. Id. at 1647-48.
94. See id. at 1622.
95. See id. at 1622-24.
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apparently, is to be derived from the observer's preexisting personal
"web of values" and perceptions.
How much so-called practical reason extends beyond inherently
anti-rationalist and logically inexplicable First Amendment
intuitionism, like almost everything else about these frustratingly
cryptic modes of First Amendment analysis, remains unclear.
Although Professor Farber suggests that intuitionism, like practical
reason, is part of "a movement away from grand theory,"97 he
ultimately rejects the notion that practical reason is identical to
intuitionism.9 But while Professor Farber extends a great deal of
effort to tell us what practical reason is not,99 he spends precious little
time telling us what it is. Indeed, he attempts to define the concept
primarily in terms of what it rejects. Practical reason means, he
asserts, "a rejection of the view that rules and precedents in and of
themselves dictate outcomes." ' He adds that
[a]t the level of legal theory, practical reason means a
rejection of foundationalism, the view that normative
conclusions can be deduced from a single unifying value or
principle. At the level of judicial practice, practical reason
rejects legal formalism, the view that the proper decision in
a case can be deduced from a pre-existing set of rules.'
The rejected techniques, Professor Farber explains, "rely heavily on
deductive logic (i.e., the syllogism) as the primary method of
analysis." ''"2
While Professor Farber candidly concedes that practical reason
"is easier to invoke than to define,""1 3 perhaps his description of what
the concept is not helps us to see that if practical reason is not
96. Id. at 1641. Note that in a subsequent article, Farber does resort to a more rationalist
form of argument to justify reduced protection for commercial speech. See generally Farber,
supra note 37. However, I have already demonstrated the flaws in his argument. See discussion
supra Part II.C. l.b.
97. Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the
Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REv. 533, 538 (1992).
98. See id. at 542 ("Whatever practical reason may be, it is neither deduction nor intuition.").
99. Professor Farber tells us, for example, that "practical reason does not mean-as is
sometimes mistakenly thought-an embrace of ad hoc decisionmaking." Id. at 538-39.
100. Id. at 539.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.; see also id. at 541 ("[A]dherents to practical reason have not fully explained what
cognitive processes in addition to deductive logic they view as legitimate.").
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identical to intuitionism, it is close enough to be considered a kissing
cousin. Both seem to share a heavily anti-rationalist view, chafing at
the restraints that syllogistic reasoning imposes on implementation of
desired decision making. In this sense, the two can be treated
fungibly for present purposes. Both modes of decision making free a
reviewing court from the bonds of reason, consistency, and
predictability that inherently characterize principled decision
making.
With what, exactly, do advocates of either approach fill the
intellectual vacuum created by their rejection of the demands of
principle and reason? One point seems clear: the anti-rationalism
that they share suggests that under both approaches, decisions are
made on the basis of some sort of unexplained-and, quite probably,
inexplicable-value choices, external to the constitutional provision
being interpreted. For if decisions did, in fact, derive from an
analysis of the value or values gleaned from the provision's text or
structure, they presumably could be explained transparently and
supported rationally. From where are these value choices, external to
the interpreted constitutional provision, to be derived? One
possibility is from the wholly subjective normative value structure of
the particular judicial decision maker."° At the very least, it would
be difficult to prevent such a result, even if it were not desired, were
these non-rationalist decision-making models to be employed. The
intellectual fog that flows from rejection of all demand of logic or
principle would inevitably provide easy cover for implementation of
the judge's personal moral or political value structure through the
case-by-case process of constitutional interpretation. A second
alternative, at least in theory, would be to fill the decision-making
vacuum with a judicial implementation of what the court determines
to be public sensibilities on the specific issue before the court. °5
Neither of these alternatives provides a satisfactory solution.
Indeed, both should frighten the stuffing out of any thoughtful
observer of the constitutional decision-making process. An approach
that condones as a guidepost for judicial application of the First
Amendment right of free expression a judge's implementation of her
own personal political, social, or moral value structure, disguised
104. See, e.g., Post, supra note 7, at 34-41.
105. See, e.g., id. at 20.
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under some vapid heading such as "intuitionism" or "practical
reason," should be viewed as the worst form of judicial
irresponsibility. Indeed, scholars of the political left who advocate
use of practical reason or intuitionism in First Amendment
interpretation should be very careful what they wish for. It is
unlikely that the "intuition" of many federal and state judges who sit
today would match those of left leaning academics. Yet if the judge
steadfastly maintains that her "intuition" is that pro-choice
demonstrators must be denied a First Amendment right to express
their views because they advocate baby killing, the most an academic
critic can respond is that his intuition differs from that of the judge-
something of an intuitionist stand-off. Reliance on intuitionism or
practical reason, then, will let constitutional protection turn on the
vagaries of subjective judicial preferences, and it will usually be
impossible to determine what those preferences are, ex ante.
Even less appealing is the use of practical reason as a means of
implementing some judicially perceived notion of widespread public
sensibilities. Initially, it is difficult to imagine a branch of
government less well suited to determine public sensibilities on a
particular issue than the unaccountable, unrepresentative federal
judiciary."' If one were to proceed on the assumption that
assessment of public sensibilities should be deemed constitutionally
significant, it would make far more sense to leave those choices to
the representative and accountable branches of government.
Moreover, the federal judiciary has no access to expensive and
carefully performed empirical studies that can provide it with
accurate information about public preferences. Finally, and most
importantly, to let First Amendment protection turn on some notion
of public sensibilities on a subject effectively turns that
countermajoritarian constitutional protection on its head. The idea of
the First Amendment, at the very least, is to protect the right to
express unpopular ideas, which are protected by the insulated
judiciary from suppression by the majority.' If the reach of the
First Amendment is somehow to be coordinated with widespread
106. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing federal judges with life tenure and protections of
their salary during good behavior); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (providing the President with
authority to nominate federal judges, subject to confirmation by the Senate).
107. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority's imposition of its views by means of censoring expression of minority views).
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public sensibilities on the subject of or views expressed in the
challenged speech, then the First Amendment will have been
effectively rendered a nullity.
It should be emphasized that in rejecting both intuitionism and
practical reason as the guidepost for First Amendment interpretation,
I do not mean to put in their stead some sort of abstract Langdellian
formalism. As I have acknowledged in past writing,' 8 cases will
inevitably arise in which the outcome cannot be predicted simply on
the basis of some formulaic statement of the law. The key, however,
is that in such cases the issue will concern the nature of the harm to
which the regulated speech gives rise and the extent to which, under
the circumstances of the particular case, that harm can appropriately
be thought to give rise to a compelling governmental interest
justifying regulation of expression. But those who reject First
Amendment protection for commercial speech cannot reasonably
argue that commercial speech-at least truthful commercial
speech-necessarily causes more harm than do all forms of fully
protected political speech, such as advocacy of violent overthrow. 9
They are, instead, making some form of judgment about the nature or
value of the expression itself.
The major distinction between practical reason and the use of a
harm standard as a qualifier of the implications of rational analysis is
that the latter, unlike the former, requires use of traditional legal
reasoning: open, reasoned debate over the choice of a substantive
standard of law, and then application of that standard to individual
cases. The decision of whether or not to permit a showing of harm
that will ever be sufficient to justify suppression of otherwise
protected speech, and the nature and degree of the showing of harm
to be required, are issues of general substantive law that are the
proper subject of debate. They are to be made openly and
consistently; when used as a justification for regulation of one type
of expression, the harm factor cannot be mysteriously excluded as a
measure of another type of expression, unless some other principled
basis exists for distinguishing between the two types of expression.
Decision makers employing First Amendment intuitionism or
108. See Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 113, 119-20 (1981) (recognizing a limited role in First Amendment analysis for case-by-
case balancing process).
109. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (per curiam).
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practical reason, in contrast, make contextual judgments that do not
demand-indeed, apparently do not permit-attempted application
of prior agreed upon general principles of decision to specific fact
situations.
It is also important to establish that neither practical reason nor
intuitionism is the necessary outgrowth of a rejection of a single
overarching value of free expression. One could conceivably
conclude that free expression is appropriately deemed to foster not a
single value but rather a complex intersection of multiple values,"' °
yet nevertheless view the creation of free speech doctrine as the
application to specific cases of one or more permutations of those
multiple intersecting values. This process would presumably be no
more or less syllogistic than the shaping of doctrine through the
application of an assumed single underlying value of free expression
to specific cases. Intuitionism and practical reason, in contrast,
eschew use of any such form of logical reasoning in favor of what is
described--euphemistically--as a more "contextual" examination.
In the case of commercial speech, decision makers who choose
to employ practical reason and intuitionism are making their "rough
judgment" that commercial speech is not worthy of protection before
the issue of harm caused by the speech is even considered. The
argument, so far as I can tell, is not that commercial speech
inherently gives rise to more harm than do more traditionally
protected types and subjects of expression. The initial question in
every First Amendment case is whether government even needs to
satisfy the compelling interest standard that is triggered when fully
protected expression is sought to be regulated. Because the
intuitionists and practical reason advocates conclude that, for
whatever reason, commercial speech is not deserving of protection in
the first place, they need never even reach the compelling interest
question. In light of their initial conclusion, under their approach
there is no First Amendment interest triggering the demand for a
110. Note that it is my view that free expression does, in fact, serve ultimately only one
value-self-realization--of which all other conceivable values are merely logical sub-values. See
Redish, The Value of Free Speech, supra note 37, at 593. However, reconsideration of that issue
is unnecessary for present purposes, because even if one were to accept the notion of a synthesis
of multiple free speech values, the application of traditional legal reason could still be employed.
Thus, while much of Professor Weinstein's response to this Article focuses on my explication of
the self-realization value, see Weinstein, supra note 44, at 155-61, that discussion is largely
irrelevant to my argument here.
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compelling interest analysis. And their initial conclusion is never
justified by resort to logic or reason that is applied consistently to all
types of expression. No justification is provided to which reasoned
response can be made. Instead, there is simply something "intuitive"
that tells us that, as Jackson and Jeffries asserted, surely "a seller
hawking his wares" deserves no constitutional protection for his
speech."'
One could conceivably seek to defend resort to intuitionism or
practical reason as an alternative to an effort to decide cases on the
basis of logic and principle by challenging the feasibility of the
rationalist enterprise. It is likely true that principled consistency will
not function like clockwork in every case. Occasions will arise, no
doubt, where reasonable people could differ as to how generally
agreed upon principles apply to specific cases. But to resort to what
ultimately amounts to a form of non-rational subjectivism and
intellectual chaos as an alternative is most assuredly the wrong
move.
It is conceivable that I am being unfair to adherents to practical
reason. Perhaps there is more "there, there" than I have recognized,
and practical reason in reality involves debate over reasons, albeit
from a purely pragmatic perspective. But "pragmatic" is a
meaningless concept absent a clear understanding of what ends one
is attempting to achieve in the first place. If those ends are
determined by anything other than pure subjective value assessment,
then they should be testable by the application of the standards of
principled consistency: like cases should be decided in a like manner.
Where the asserted reason for excluding commercial speech from the
scope of the First Amendment applies with equal force to an
expressive category to which full protection is nevertheless extended,
there necessarily exists some difference other than the asserted
principled basis for exclusion of commercial speech in the first place.
Once deconstructed, then, all that remains are the subjective
differences in the unrestrained value preferences of the decision
maker that are most comfortably associated with the instinctive
intuitionism that runs counter to any precept of reasoned debate.
In the wonderful world of practical reason and First Amendment
intuitionism, none of my critiques of the logical underinclusiveness
111. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 84, at 14; see discussion supra Part II.C.2.
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of the asserted rationalist justifications for providing reduced
protection for commercial speech demands response or defense." 2
No logical, principled, or reasoned defense of manipulative
underinclusiveness is required when the justification for the
exclusion of commercial speech from the First Amendment's
protection is, simply, that it somehow intuitively just does not seem
to fit in. But when one recognizes the pathetic conceptual
inadequacies of such an approach to First Amendment interpretation
and the serious practical dangers to which it gives rise, the need for
meeting the challenge of commercial speech protection on the basis
of transparency, consistency, and principle will become inevitable.
As I have demonstrated, there exists no basis in logic or principle to
treat commercial speech differently from other categories of fully
protected expression."3
3. Ideological Grounds
On relatively rare occasion, scholars have been mercifully open
and candid in evincing academic hostility toward commercial
speech. These scholars have made fairly clear that their opposition
to the protection of commercial speech is grounded in their disdain
for the expression's impact on the functioning of society-in short,
their ideological hostility toward commercial speech." 4  This
ideological rationale can take one of two forms. First, it may
represent a generic ideological rejection of the very economic system
out of which commercial advertising grows. Second, it may
constitute a narrower form of policy preference that condemns the
particular product or service being promoted by the commercial
advertising in question. The thinking behind this narrower rationale
is presumably that, as a practical matter, the only individuals who
possess sufficient incentive to promote the product or activity to the
public are those seeking to sell it. Thus, to stop the commercial
advertising is tantamount to halting all promotion of the use of the
product or service. Under such a regulatory approach, it would make
perfect sense to extend full protection to the speech of those
attacking the product or service, but either no protection or only
112. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
113. See discussion supra Part II.C.I.




limited protection to speech promoting its purchase or use, simply
because the former category of expression furthers the predetermined
policy goal while the latter undermines it.
The problem with either of the conceivable forms of an
ideological or policy-based rationale is, as I have argued throughout
this Article, that both of them are fundamentally inconsistent with
the core premises of a system of meaningful free speech protection
and the democratic structure of which free expression is a central
element. Surely, the Supreme Court today would not countenance a
law restricting pro-socialist expression on the grounds that those in
power believe that socialism is unwise or immoral and fear that such
expression might lead to society's adoption of socialist precepts.
Nor would it uphold a law restricting anti-socialist expression
because those in power have deemed socialism to be the preferred
social economic theory. Under such a blatantly viewpoint-based
form of selective protection, the control of expression would be
reduced to nothing more than a struggle for political power.
Whichever side attains political power would presumably be able to
constitutionally shut off all expression that it found to be
ideologically distasteful or in disagreement with the currently
predominating ideology.
Nevertheless, critics of commercial speech have on occasion
openly acknowledged the relevance to their analysis of either
ideologically oriented concerns or subjective social or political
values. For example, R. George Wright, a strong and articulate
opponent of commercial speech protection, argued: "[Clommercial
getting and spending is, except in the case of the poor, at best weakly
correlated with happiness or well-being."" 5  He further expressed
concern over "the ways in which commercialism and commercial
values affect how we experience the otherwise non-commercial
elements of our lives.""' 6 Wright thus overtly demonstrated his
subjective ideological distaste for commercial speech as a predicate
for his attack on its constitutional protection.
Reliance on such ideological motivations effectively reduces
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exists a political war of all against all." 7 In such circumstances,
whichever ideological camp attains political power may, quite
legitimately, suppress the speech of its opposition on no grounds
other than naked distaste for the political viewpoints expressed in
that speech. However, life in such a constitutional state of nature is,
as Hobbes warned, likely to be nasty, brutish, and short. As a
theoretical matter, then, preference for a particular ideology should
never play any part in justifying governmental restriction of
expression.
4. Objections to Commercial Speech Protection and
the Parameters of Neutral Principles
Each of the three categories of objections to commercial speech
protection-rationalist, intuitionist, and ideological-is seriously
flawed in a variety of ways. The primary concern with the three
categories, however, is not merely the manner in which each is
flawed, but rather the way in which each threatens the core values
underlying free speech protection. It is my contention that in
attempting to construe the First Amendment, each of the three
categories, in its own way, largely represents a form of
impermissible viewpoint discrimination undermining of the very
core of what the First Amendment is all about. Admittedly, these are
rather strong words. But it is, I believe, reasonable to conclude that
each of the three categories of objections is ultimately grounded in
distaste for what commercial speech facilitates and represents, in a
manner wholly unrelated to a properly value-neutral approach to
First Amendment interpretation.
The reflexive response to my suggestion, no doubt, is that one
cannot demand value neutrality in First Amendment interpretation.
To the contrary, the argument proceeds, First Amendment
construction necessarily involves a choice among values that free
speech protection is designed to foster. This is no doubt true.
However, the value neutrality that is necessarily implicated in First
Amendment analysis differs fundamentally from the form of value
invocation triggered by the three categories of objections to
commercial speech protection. As I have already demonstrated,
117. THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 185 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin Books 1968)
(1651).
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those objections are not premised on a plausible selection of one
conceivable free speech value over another. If they were, the
objections would be applied consistently to the protection of other
types of expression which readily receive full constitutional
protection."8 Rather, they are grounded in the decision maker's
preference for particular political or ideological value preferences
that would, in the decision maker's view, be threatened or
undermined by the extension of constitutional protection to
commercial speech. Recognition of these two levels of value
analysis is essential to an understanding of the judiciary's
appropriate role in enforcing First Amendment protections.
The essence of this distinction in levels of value analysis is
embodied in and policed by the doctrinally well-established
prohibition on viewpoint-based discrimination. Therefore, I now
turn to a description and analysis of this core First Amendment
doctrine.
III. VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION AND
THE FOUNDATIONS OF FREE EXPRESSION
A. The Uniquely Invidious Nature of Viewpoint Discrimination
How absolute the First Amendment is has long been the subject
of scholarly and judicial debate." 9  What should not-and, for the
most part, has not-been the subject of serious dispute is that
regulation of expression that is grounded in nothing more than
governmental hostility to the normative viewpoint to be expressed is
unqualifiedly unconstitutional. There can be no exceptions to the
constitutional bar of viewpoint-based regulations-at least in the
context of coercive regulations and prohibitions 2°-because to
118. See discussion supra Part II.C. 1.d.
119. Compare N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 720 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (First Amendment is absolute), and Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is
an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 246-48 (First Amendment protection of political speech is
absolute), with Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absohtes in the
Balance, 50 CAL. L. REV. 821, 825 (1962) (First Amendment requires use of a balancing
approach).
120. At the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review's live symposium, Professor Post pointed out
that presumably President Bush could fire Secretary of State Rice for suggesting the Iraq War was
a mistake without violating the First Amendment, even though it would have, of course, been due
to the expression of her viewpoint. Robert Post, Remarks at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review Symposium: Commercial Speech: Past, Present & Future (Feb. 24, 2007) [hereinafter
Post, Symposium Remarks]. I fully concede the point. However, losing the position of Secretary
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permit one exception is effectively to permit all viewpoint-based
regulations. 12'
In every conceivable instance, a viewpoint-based regulation of
expression is, by definition, grounded not in a principled effort to
interpret and apply the structural values underlying the free speech
protection, but rather in a subjective assessment of moral and/or
socio-political considerations that are external to the First
Amendment. These considerations necessarily grow out of
normative concerns that exist wholly beyond the boundaries of the
First Amendment. This is so, because the First Amendment's
immediate focus is on allowing the private individual or entity, not
the government, to decide what is normatively dictated. The
viewpoint neutrality of the First Amendment's free-expression
guarantee is the logical outgrowth of the nation's original
commitment to democratically based rule. As a definitional matter, a
democratic form of government means that the electorate possesses
the fundamental freedom to choose those who will govern day-to-
day policy choices.122 Moreover, the electorate is even permitted to
alter the counter-simple majoritarian limits imposed by the
of State because of expression of one's viewpoint implicates an entirely distinct area of First
Amendment analysis concerning government subsidies and benefits-a subject on which both
Professor Post and I have written. See REDISH, MONEY TALKS, supra note 18, at 196-231;
Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 152-53 (1996). I refer here entirely to the
more traditional and prevalent First Amendment context of directly coercive government
regulation of expression. Surely the fact that a President can fire a cabinet officer for expressing
unpopular views does not in any way imply that government can place a private citizen in jail for
expressing a similarly unpopular view. I cannot imagine that Professor Post would disagree with
this uncontroversial assertion.
121. At the live symposium, Professor Post suggested that numerous regulations of viewpoint
are permitted, consistent with the First Amendment. Post, Symposium Remarks, supra note 120.
In attempting to support his assertion, however, Professor Post evinced substantial confusion over
the nature of the viewpoint discrimination concept. Id. For example, he pointed to the fact that a
doctor may be penalized for incorrectly reporting to a patient that a lesion was not cancerous. Id.
This example, however, has absolutely nothing to do with the concept of viewpoint
discrimination as employed in First Amendment analysis. That concept is confined to
governmental penalizations of expression for no reason other than disagreement with or disdain
for the normative views expressed.
122. See HENRY MAYO, AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 103 (1960)
("[E]verything necessary to [democratic] theory may be put in terms of (a) legislation (or
decision-makers) who are (b) legitimated or authorized to enact public policies, and who are (c)
subject or responsible to popular control at free election."); J. ROLAND PENNOCK, DEMOCRATIC
POLITICAL THEORY 310 (1979) ("Elections are thought to constitute the great sanction for
assuring representative behavior, by showing what the voters consider to be their interests by
giving them the incentive to pursue those objectives.").
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Constitution by resort to the super-majoritarian amendment
process.'23
Free expression, as Alexander Meiklejohn told us, facilitates
performance of the self-governing function by providing the
electorate with information and opinion concerning policy making
choices that will face those chosen to serve.'24 Since the electorate
possesses the ultimate authority to put candidates into office who
take any position, it logically follows that those in power cannot be
permitted to manipulate the political debate in a manner designed
strategically to control the available scope of governmental choices.
Any other result would undermine the individual citizen's integrity
as a free-thinking human being worthy of respect. It would also
effectively gut the operation of the democratic process of which the
First Amendment is a logical outgrowth.
The absoluteness of the constitutional prohibition on viewpoint
discrimination flows from recognition of the unique harm that such
regulations necessarily cause to the foundations of free expression.
It is impossible, ex ante, to authorize exceptions to this prohibition
because the content of those exceptions would have to be determined
by those in power; it is those in power who would necessarily
determine which viewpoints were to be deemed so offensive as to
justify suppression of their expression. Presumably, they would
choose to exempt regulations of those particular viewpoints that, as a
subjective matter, they found the most offensive. If power were to
be subsequently transferred to another group with a different set of
ideological preferences, the exemptions to the constitutional
prohibition on viewpoint discrimination would be changed to
comport with the subjective preferences of that group.
For example, if conservatives were in power, they might well
deem sufficiently offensive, as to justify exemption from the bar
against viewpoint discrimination, expression of viewpoints such as
that a woman should have a right to choose to obtain an abortion, or
that the United States is fundamentally an evil nation, or even that
123. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
124. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 38, at 24-25. Note that many commentators, including myself,
believe the First Amendment does far more than this. See generally Redish, The Value of Free
Speech, supra note 37 (First Amendment fosters self-realization). However, at the very least, the
First Amendment must be deemed to protect the expression that influences and facilitates the
voter's democratic choice in the voting booth. For present purposes, we need not take the
argument further.
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we should retreat from Iraq. If the political left were to replace the
conservatives in power, viewpoints exempted from the bar against
discrimination might well be changed to include expression of the
view that abortion is murder or that affirmative action is evil.
Perhaps there are certain moral views that are so widely accepted
that expression of a contrary view would universally be deemed
offensive. In such an event, the role of the First Amendment as a
protection of unpopular views would be gutted. Put bluntly, the
decision as to which viewpoints could be exempted from the
regulatory bar would inevitably be determined by the political
agenda of those in power. The end result, therefore, would be a
political jungle in which those in power are able to suppress the
expression of those whose views they find deeply offensive. Thus,
whatever one believes about the absolutism of free speech protection
in other contexts, the bar against viewpoint-based regulations must
be deemed absolute, lest it not exist at all.'25
The most fascinating aspect of the constitutional world of
viewpoint discrimination is that it is simultaneously so obvious as a
core element of First Amendment theory and so counterintuitive-
and often devastating-to those operating in the real world, away
from the lofty heights of constitutional theory.'26 The classic
illustration is the Skokie case of the late 1970s, where a ragged-but,
to most, understandably highly offensive-band of Nazis sought to
march in a Chicago suburb with a large Jewish population
(including, at the time, many concentration camp survivors). 2 7 The
courts that dealt with challenges to Skokie ordinances designed to
prevent the march were quite clear about their unconstitutionality,
125. For a thoughtful explanation of the constitutional prohibition on viewpoint regulation,
see generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar
Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81 (1978). For an explanation of the
prohibition on viewpoint discrimination from the perspective of equal protection theory, see
generally Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI.
L. REV. 20 (1975).
126. In his response to this Article, Professor Post contends that the concept of viewpoint
discrimination, as I describe it, is too vague and convoluted to be of much help in First
Amendment analysis. Post, supra note 120. I find the assertion puzzling, to say the least. While
it is true that Professor Post appears to have difficulty getting his arms around the concept, see
supra note 121, the sources previously cited make clear that the concept of viewpoint
discrimination is both well-established and well-understood in First Amendment theory. See
supra note 125; see also Farber, supra note 37, at 577 ("In First Amendment jurisprudence,
restrictions based on viewpoint are especially suspect.").
127. Vill. of Skokie v. Nat'l Socialist Party of Am., 313 N.E.2d 21, 22 (Ill. 1978).
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whatever distaste they may have had for the political message of the
march.'28 This conclusion was constitutionally dictated because any
other result would have led to normative censorship by those in
power-a result wholly inconsistent with the foundations and
premises of a democratic society.
That the bar to viewpoint-based discrimination must be deemed
absolute, however, is of little help in recognizing when a regulation
of expression is viewpoint based and when it is not. It is to this
question that I now turn.
B. Defining and Recognizing Viewpoint Discrimination
1. The Essential Characteristic of Viewpoint Discrimination
On a purely conceptual level, viewpoint discrimination is not
difficult to distinguish from more principled forms of First
Amendment selectivity-even those forms with which one
ultimately disagrees as a matter of free speech theory. Disputes over
the scope of First Amendment protection grounded in principle
concern factors that are "internal" to the First Amendment. The
debate over which principled means of construing the First
Amendment, in other words, will concern one of two issues: (1) the
extent to which the expression in question is deemed to foster the
value or values that underlie the guarantee of free expression, or (2)
the extent to which the harm that the expression would likely give
rise to justifies restriction.
Viewpoint discrimination, on the other hand, is grounded in
considerations that are "external" to the First Amendment. By this
assertion, I mean that the driving normative force has nothing to do
with a good faith effort to determine the process or structural values
of free expression. Rather, it flows from normative premises
determined by entirely unrelated factors of political, social,
economic, moral, or religious beliefs or concerns that are wholly
external to the First Amendment itself. They grow not out of the
process-based analysis that seeks to create the most viable or
appropriate constitutional system, but rather from unrelated personal
beliefs of those imposing the restriction. To those seeking to impose
viewpoint discrimination, the First Amendment is not something to
128. Id. at 26; Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1207 (7th Cir. 1978).
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be deciphered and structured, but rather a potential obstacle to
attainment of their political or ideological values and goals that needs
to be circumvented.
While this dichotomy seems relatively easy to recognize on a
purely conceptual level, it is not always a simple task to separate
legitimate, principled (if controversial) constitutional analysis, on the
one hand, from invidious viewpoint discrimination that grows out of
normative premises wholly unrelated to constitutional analysis, on
the other. As the following sections demonstrate, however, certain
guideposts may be recognized to help draw this vitally important
distinction in the First Amendment trenches of real world
adjudication.
2. Viewpoint Discrimination and the Avoidance of "Harm"
In its starkest form, viewpoint discrimination is relatively easy
to recognize. Classic illustrations are not difficult to hypothesize: a
law prohibiting speech that argues against (or in favor of) the
government's Iraq policy; a law prohibiting expression advocating
(or opposing) abortion rights; or a law prohibiting anti-capitalist
advocacy. When such cases have arisen, the Supreme Court has
generally been quick to strike them down.129 A problem quickly
arises, however, when supporters of the selectively based restriction
reflexively invoke the fear of "harm" that might result from allowing
the regulated expression. After all, if expression is being suppressed
or punished in order to prevent "harm," then it is not being regulated
simply to quiet expression of an offensive viewpoint. Surely, the
argument would proceed; a constitutional prohibition on viewpoint
regulation would not prevent the government from punishing
advocacy of violent criminal behavior. Sloppy or conclusory
invocation of the threat of harm as a justification for suppression,
129. See, e.g,, Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1970) (holding unconstitutional
a congressional ban on the unauthorized wearing of American military uniforms in a manner
calculated to discredit the armed forces); see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533
U.S. 98, 107 (2001) (holding that a school's exclusion of a Christian children's club from meeting
after hours at school, based on its religious nature, was unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001) (finding as
unconstitutional a restriction that prohibited funding to organizations that represented clients
seeking to challenge existing welfare laws); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 835-37 (1995) (holding that a university's denial of funds to a religious
organization amounted to viewpoint discrimination).
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then, could easily consume the beneficial impact of the constitutional
prohibition on viewpoint regulation.
There exist three ways in which this danger can be averted.
First, at the outset it is important to distinguish between "harms" that
flow from illegal or extra-legal behavior, on the one hand, and harms
that flow from either lawful behavior or from efforts to bring about
proper governmental alteration of existing law. Individuals have a
First Amendment right to urge a governmental body-judicial,
legislative, or executive-to alter existing legal standards, even if
those currently in power would find that such legal changes lead to
normatively unacceptable results. For example, if the First
Amendment means anything at all, it must protect an individual's
right to urge that the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education,"3 ° finding unconstitutional so-called "separate-but-equal"
laws, should be overruled, even though most of us no doubt would be
morally outraged by such a reversal. An individual must also
possess a First Amendment right to urge Congress to repeal Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3' prohibiting racial, religious, or
gender-based discrimination in private hiring, though, once again,
most of us today would (hopefully) find such a change in the law
morally repugnant. On a political level, one could easily oppose
such proposals on the ground that their acceptance would cause
significant "harm" to racial minorities or women. But for the First
Amendment to work, "harm" that is considered sufficiently severe to
justify suppression cannot be defined to include bringing about a
distasteful, albeit lawful, political result.
Second, the courts must be wary of laws that seek to avoid harm
by resorting to a suspiciously underinclusive invocation of the
danger of harm. Once again, the example of an ordinance
prohibiting distribution of anti-war literature on Michigan Avenue in
Chicago during rush hour because of the danger of harm cannot be
permitted to stand unless all forms and subjects of expression at the
same time and place are also banned. The same would be true of an
attempt to justify a law making criminal the burning of the American
flag on grounds that such action would give rise to a serious fire
hazard. Finally, we should demand that any claim of even potential
130. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2000).
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unlawful harm be established not as some vague, undefined possible
injury at some point in the unspecified future, but rather as a more
definite and proximate threat.'32 This is the goal of the "clear and
present danger" test, currently embodied, for the most part, in
controlling Supreme Court doctrine in its most protective form.'33
3. Recognizing the Different Forms of Viewpoint Discrimination
Unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination is not always as
direct or obvious as many of the examples described in the prior
section. Those are situations in which the government sought to
regulate expression of a specific viewpoint, regardless of who was
expressing it. The perceived offensiveness of the words themselves,
standing alone, were what triggered suppression. Other, less obvious
or direct situations of viewpoint regulation, however, will arise, and
it is important to see them as equally invidious forms of speech
regulation.
One example of such indirect viewpoint regulation could be
described as a type of "heckler's veto." In these situations,
government will prohibit expression of derogatory comments about a
particular ethnic, racial or religious group, even where the speech in
question is not spoken directly to a member of one of those groups
and lacks any immediately coercive quality,'34 for no reason other
than that the speech is thought to be demoralizing or hurtful to the
affected group. Here the governmental regulator is effectively
operating as the agent of the affected group. Even more clear are
classic "heckler's veto" situations, where government suppresses
speech because of fear that others who hear it will be so offended
that they threaten harm to the speaker. Here, too, the regulator is
operating as a type of agent for those who are likely to find the
speaker's views offensive. A viable system of free expression could
not possibly function under such a framework. At most, reliance on
these concerns to justify suppression could be accepted only in the
132. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see MARTIN H. REDISH, THE LOGIC OF
PERSECUTION: FREE EXPRESSION AND THE MCCARTHY ERA 63-131 (2005) [hereinafter REDISH,
THE LOGIC OF PERSECUTIONI.
133. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969) (per curiam).
134. In this context, it is important to emphasize that I am in no way suggesting that harassing
or coercive speech, said to unwilling listeners, is protected by the First Amendment. For a




most compelling of immediate, narrowly defined circumstances,
where authorities reasonably conclude that they would be unable to
prevent serious violence.
A second form of indirect viewpoint discrimination occurs
where government suppresses speech not because of the words of the
speech, but because of who the speaker is. For example, a law
prohibiting Democrats from speaking should still be deemed
invidious viewpoint discrimination, even though it does not directly
focus on the expression of a particular viewpoint. In this example,
the restriction of expression turns not at all on the specific words that
the Democrat would utter. But focus on the nature of the speaker
here serves as a relatively simple surrogate for viewpoint
discrimination. The speaker is prohibited from speaking on the basis
of his or her pre-existing ideological association.
Since these regulations go to the speaker and not the speech, it
might be suggested that their unconstitutionality is more
appropriately grounded in the Equal Protection Clause,135 rather than
the First Amendment right of free expression.136 Nonetheless, I
suppose the end result would be the same. I believe, however, that
the First Amendment, standing on its own, appropriately invalidates
such a law as invidious viewpoint discrimination. The fact that the
viewpoint regulation is one step removed from the expression itself
should make no difference, because the right of the speaker to speak
is being "abridged" as a result of his pre-existing ideological and
political expressive associations-the core concern of the ban on
viewpoint regulations.
4. Judicially Imposed Viewpoint Regulation
The judiciary, like the other branches of government, is
constrained by the First Amendment.'37 It is therefore conceivable
that the actions of the judicial branch, as easily as the executive or
135. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4. Though the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause does not apply to the federal government, the Supreme Court has held that the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause is properly construed to contain a prohibition on equal
protection violations. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-99 (1954).
136. U.S. CONST. amend 1. For an attempt to intertwine the Equal Protection and Free Speech
clauses, see Karst, supra note 125, at 26-29. See also Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94-
98 (1972).
137. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) (stating judicial imposition of
liability in libel suits may implicate First Amendment protection).
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legislative branches of government, may contravene the First
Amendment's absolute prohibition on viewpoint discrimination.
Judicial action can potentially interact with viewpoint
discrimination in either of two ways: (1) by condoning or facilitating
implementation of viewpoint discrimination initially imposed by one
or both of the majoritarian branches of government; or (2) by
shaping or applying First Amendment doctrine selectively, where no
basis for such a disparity in First Amendment treatment-apart from
the differences in viewpoint--exists to justify such distinctions. It is
important to recognize, then, that the judiciary may well be the
culprit, and not merely the enabler. The difference in judicial
culpability can be best understood by use of hypothetical examples.
First, imagine an action taken by one or both of the political branches
selectively discriminating against expression of one viewpoint. If the
judiciary upholds this discrimination against First Amendment
attack, it will have acted as an enabler. Now imagine a law that
indiscriminately restricts expressive activity by all. Were the courts
to uphold that law against constitutional attack against speech
expressing one viewpoint but invalidate it as to the expression of a
different viewpoint, the judiciary itself would be imposing the
viewpoint discrimination.
5. Recognizing the "Twilight Zone"
of Viewpoint Discrimination
To this point, my descriptions, explanation, and analysis of the
concept of viewpoint discrimination, while hopefully illuminating,
should hardly be considered controversial to theorists of the First
Amendment. Few, if any, knowledgeable observers would dispute
the inherently invidious nature of viewpoint-based discrimination in
light of the manner in which it inevitably undermines the values
served by democracy and the system of free expression of which it is
a part. However, there exists a form of viewpoint discrimination that
may not be as readily recognized as either the direct, indirect, or
judicial forms of the First Amendment pathology described to this
point. I refer to this category as "twilight zone" viewpoint
discrimination, because the resulting invidious harms to free speech
interests are just as great as the more classic forms of the category,
even though they are, superficially, one or two steps removed.
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What distinguishes twilight zone viewpoint discrimination from
the more classic variety is the fact that it focuses on neither the
normative positions taken in the substance of the regulated speech
(direct viewpoint discrimination) nor the ideological or political
affiliations of the speaker (indirect viewpoint discrimination). It is,
rather, grounded in hostility toward what might be called, for lack of
a better phrase, the "ideological ether" of which both the speech and
the speaker are a part. In these situations, the speaker herself may
have no ex ante offensive socio-political affiliations, and what she
says, in and of itself, asserts nothing to which the regulator is
normatively hostile. However, both the speaker and the speech are
themselves outgrowths of, and participants in, a broader
communicative process which the regulator finds offensive on
ideological grounds. Of course, if the speaker and the speech are
part of a broader non-expressive, conduct-based activity deemed
harmful by those in authority, the government may prohibit the
relevant conduct, consistent with constitutional protections other than
the First Amendment. In so doing, the government may sweep
within its reach any communicative activity that forms an essential
element of that conduct, subject, I suppose, to whatever limited First
Amendment protection is extended to advocacy of unlawful conduct.
But where the primary or intended impact is on expression or
communication, the fact that regulatory hostility focuses not on the
specific speech or speaker, but rather on the ideological foundations
of the system of which the speech and speaker are an inherent part,
does not alter the invidious viewpoint discriminatory character of the
expressive regulation. As in the case of classic viewpoint
discrimination, government is regulating expression on the basis of
ideological hostility, and for that reason it is seeking to prevent
communications among private individuals or entities. As in the
case of classic viewpoint discrimination, penalizing expression is
premised on grounds wholly external to the First Amendment and
government is selectively restricting expression in an attempt to
foster one ideology and hinder another.
It is probable that relatively few categories of twilight zone
viewpoint regulation exist. But this fact makes them no less
problematic when they do actually occur. One example of this
category is obscenity. When government suppresses or punishes
obscene publications, it is likely that the neither the regulated
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expression nor the speaker have directly assumed an ideological
position found offensive by the regulators.138 For example, regulated
obscenity usually does not, on its face, urge creation of a society
characterized by free love. Were government to prohibit expression
of the view that society should adopt such a free love system, I
imagine a court would have to strike the prohibition down as
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. However, both the
speaker and the expression are outgrowths of a system whose
essential premise is, if not free love, at the very least a belief in a
significant loosening of societal mores about sex. Suppression of
obscene expression, then, grows out of regulatory hostility toward
the moral and socio-political premises implicitly advocated by the
obscene communication. The regulatory hostility is effectively
directed at the "ideological ether" surrounding the obscenity. If
government may not punish expression that voices a particular
ideological position, the same logic should prevent it from punishing
such "satellite" expression because of hostility to that ideological
position.
The one conceivable distinction between direct regulation of
expression of the ideological position itself and regulation of such
satellite expression is the possibility that the satellite expression
gives rise to harm to which direct ideological advocacy does not.
Advocacy of violent overthrow, for example, is surely not the same
thing as an actual attempt to overthrow. But as long as we are
speaking solely of satellite expression rather than conduct, and the
harms that allegedly flow from both ideology and satellite expression
are basically communicative in nature, this distinction should be
deemed irrelevant. In the case of obscenity, for example,
government would seek to control obscene narratives for much the
same reason that it would seek to prohibit advocacy of free love. In
both situations, government regulates because it does not wish to
allow private individuals to decide for themselves whether to alter
their mores in ways found offensive by those in power.
138. To avoid triggering potentially intractable complications involving the speech-conduct
dichotomy, I refer here solely to obscene publications that do not include photographic depictions
of real individuals. I thus confine the discussion to pure narrative or artistic renderings.
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IV. COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND
THE TWILIGHT ZONE OF VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION
As in the case of obscenity, exclusion of commercial speech
from the protective scope of the First Amendment could conceivably
be characterized as a form of twilight zone viewpoint discrimination.
If, for purposes of argument, we assume that exclusion of
commercial speech from the First Amendment's protective scope is
based on something other than either principled constitutional
analysis or at least a flawed attempt to employ principled
constitutional analysis,139 the only alternative is to assume that it
grows out of some form of hostility to or disdain for the capitalist
system of which commercial speech is a part. While exceptions may
exist, political hostility to commercial speech will usually not be
grounded in either the ideological affiliations of the speaker or in any
ideological viewpoint expressed in the substance of the regulated
speech. But if the basis for the exclusion of commercial speech
grows not out of a principled "internal" analysis of First Amendment
value, but rather from political or socio-economic hostility to the
capitalist system of which commercial speech is a part, then the
discriminatory treatment given commercial speech is appropriately
characterized as an invidious form of viewpoint discrimination.
Am I suggesting that any jurist or scholar who opposes full First
Amendment protection for commercial speech is necessarily engaged
in the surreptitious and manipulative process of stratifying First
Amendment protection in order to furtively undermine capitalism?
As a practical matter, it would be difficult to maintain this position,
given that several jurists associated with the political right have
consistently opposed full First Amendment protection for
commercial speech.14 ° There are, to be sure, scholars and jurists who
have no moral, economic, or political problem with the capitalist
system, but who strongly believe in generally limiting
countermajoritarian judicial interference in decisions of the
139. See discussion supra Part II.C. 1.b-f.
140. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 781 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (believing that the Court's decision to extend First
Amendment protection to commercial endeavors is troublesome); Richard A. Posner, Free
Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 22 n.43, 39-40 (1986) (stating
that because commercial speech does not produce significant external benefits it should be
afforded less constitutional protection).
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democratic process.' 41 These jurists or scholars-Judge Bork, for
example-may consistently seek to confine First Amendment
protection narrowly to speech directly affecting the political
process.1 42 I may well conclude that such skimpy protection of free
expression is grossly underprotective,143 but it would be difficult to
characterize their rejection of commercial speech protection as a
form of furtive manipulation.
Scholars or jurists who reject full First Amendment protection
for commercial speech, but simultaneously extend such protection to
other forms of non-political, economically motivated expression,
must fall into one of two categories. First, they may incorrectly fail
to recognize the inescapable intellectual inconsistency in their
positions. Second, they may be employing a form of indirect,
twilight zone viewpoint discrimination. There is no third alternative
for scholars or jurists who purport to employ a rationalist approach to
First Amendment interpretation. To the extent these jurists reject
commercial speech protection, I am forced to conclude that, at least
to the extent that they simultaneously would protect other forms of
equally non-political or economically motivated expression, they
have incorrectly drawn logically indefensible distinctions in their
efforts to avoid judicial disruption of democratically ordained
choices.
To the extent observers choose to exclude commercial speech
from First Amendment protection by resorting to some form of
intuitive, non-rationalist process, it is conceivable that they do not
themselves even realize that they are actually implementing a form
of implicit viewpoint discrimination. Ultimately, my argument
comes down to this: unless an observer who chooses to reduce
protection for commercial advertising (1) simultaneously reduces
protection for Consumer Reports and consumer advocate groups; (2)
rejects or reduces protection for political speech motivated by goals
of personal gain on behalf of the speaker; or (3) puts forth a
consistent, coherent, non-viewpoint-based justification for drawing
141. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971) ("Constitutional protection should be accorded only to speech that is
explicitly political.").
142. See id.
143. See generally Redish, The Value of Free Speech, supra note 37 (arguing that any




such a First Amendment distinction (a justification I have yet to
hear), his or her refusal to protect commercial speech, at the very
least, must be considered presumptively either an illustration of
viewpoint-based discrimination or simply a failure to understand the
inescapable logical implications of his or her analysis.
The viewpoint discrimination that may well plague the
arguments for reduced protection of commercial speech constitutes a
synthesis of two categories of discrimination: twilight zone
discrimination and judicially imposed discrimination.'" It belongs in
the twilight zone category for the reasons just described.'45 It also
belongs in the judicially imposed category, however, because those
urging the reduction or exclusion are doing so not in the form of
legislative or executive discrimination, but rather through the judicial
exclusion of commercial speech from the First Amendment's
protective scope. While this exclusion will of course facilitate
legislative or executive discriminations, even standing alone it
represents an unconstitutional, judicially imposed discrimination
against a form of expression. Moreover, such judicial discrimination
is an ideologically based hostility grounded in something other than
an internal, principled analysis and implementation of free speech
values. It is as if the Court invalidated a ban on picketing by pro-
choice demonstrators but not on an identical ban on picketing by pro-
life demonstrators.
The viewpoint-based nature of the segregation of commercial
speech is especially underscored in situations in which a commercial
enterprise is enmeshed in a dispute about its product or service with
consumer advocates or members of the media. Take, for example,
Ralph Nader's attack on the safety of the Chevrolet Corvair.46 No
one, it is fair to suppose, would suggest that Nader possessed
anything short of full First Amendment protection for his critical
comments. However, were General Motors to attempt to defend its
product's safety in response to Nader's attacks, automatically its
comments are transformed into lesser protected--or unprotected' 47-
144. See discussion supra Part III.B.4-5.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 139-143.
146. See, e.g., RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED 3-41 (1965).
147. Earlier in this Article, I suggested that the Supreme Court has in practice, if not in name,
extended full First Amendment protection to commercial speech. See supra notes 4-5 and
accompanying text. But it is only with respect to truthful commercial speech that this is the case.
The protections of the "actual malice" test of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-
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commercial speech. The same is true of the more recent dispute
between the media and Nike. When The New York Times columnist
Bob Herbert criticizes Nike for using near slave labor in third world
countries to manufacturer its sneakers,148 again no one could question
the extension of full First Amendment protection to his statements.
But when Nike seeks to respond, because it is effectively promoting
sales of its product, its constitutional protection is reduced.149 In
these situations, as Justice Scalia has accurately analogized in a
different context, one side has to fight according to the Marquis of
Queensbury Rules while the other side can gouge or hit below the
belt. 5' And the viewpoint always afforded the lesser level of
80 (1964), are denied to commercial speech, while they are extended to false non-commercial
speech. Also, as previously noted, a number of highly respected scholars have argued that,
contrary to the view of the Court, commercial speech is entirely undeserving of First Amendment
protection. See supra note 19.
148. Bob Herbert, In America: Nike's Pyramid Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1996, at A17;
Bob Herbert, In America: The Wrong Indonesian, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1996, at A35; Bob
Herbert, In America: Nike Blinks, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1998, at A33.
149. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (Cal. 2003), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003),
and cert. dismissed, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
150. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (plurality opinion). At the live
symposium that gave rise to this issue of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, it was suggested
that a rational basis for distinguishing between Nike and its accusers is that Nike has special
access to knowledge on the question, and a significant degree of power and access for the
expression of its views. Remarks at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Symposium:
Commercial Speech: Past, Present & Future (Feb. 24, 2007). But much the same could be said of
one of its primary attackers, Bob Herbert of The New York Times. No one can doubt the Times's
power and access in the media world. And while of course Herbert cannot be assumed to have
the same access to information about Nike as Nike itself does, one can reasonably wonder why, if
he lacks adequate information about Nike, he is making accusations in the first place. Moreover,
under Sullivan's actual malice test, Herbert cannot be held liable for product defamation even if
he was grossly negligent in making the accusations. It is unclear why a lack of comparative
access to information should insulate such grossly negligent behavior-except, of course, for the
fact that we place a premium on free expression. It is a mystery why we would not provide equal
breathing room, even for an individual or entity with presumably superior access. Moreover, to
suggest that Nike's arguable superiority in access to information logically leads to using a
standard tougher than actual malice misses the point. The issue, from the perspective of the
chilling effect concern evinced in Sullivan, is not what Nike does or does not know, but rather
what Nike will be chilled from saying because of use of the stricter standard of liability. In any
event, under the actual malice test, Nike's superior access to information would simply mean it
would be easier to establish its knowledge of falsity.
Most importantly, in no other context of First Amendment analysis do we ever impose
comparative gradations of protection on the basis of the relative power of the speaker or the
speaker's access to information. Resort to this rationale to justify the outrageous disparity in
protection in Nike, then, only goes to underscore the discriminatory treatment received by those
speakers who advocate purchase of their product or service.
In any event, Consumer Reports rarely lacks for either power or information access. Yet
Consumer Reports is all but universally extended full First Amendment protection by courts and
commentators.
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protection is the pro-business side of the debate. It would be
impossible to hypothesize a starker illustration of intentional and
invidious viewpoint discrimination-discrimination that takes place
only because of the reduced protection given to commercial speech.
Whether the urged exclusion or reduction of commercial speech
protection necessarily derives from "external" ideological hostility is
another matter. It should be recalled that a number of rationalist
arguments have been or could be made to support a principled
internally grounded basis for a reduction in commercial speech
protection. But as already demonstrated, even if they are assumed to
be valid bases for reduced protection in the abstract, these asserted
distinctions are inevitably applied in an irrationally underinclusive
manner.' 51  One cannot, for example, rely on the ground that
commercial speech involves matters not worthy of First Amendment
concern, because it is almost universally accepted that Consumer
Reports, which focuses on identical issues, receives full protection.
Nor can one rely on the ground that commercial speech is motivated
by base concerns of personal economic gain, because much fully
protected expression is also motivated, largely or exclusively, by
personal economic gain. The exclusion cannot be premised on the
ground that in commercial speech cases the speaker is a profit-
making corporation, because much expression by profit-making
corporations is fully protected in other contexts. Finally, an equally
insufficient basis for exclusion is that commercial speech, because of
its inherently self-interested nature, will always be misleading due to
its strategically motivated selectiveness and slant. The exact same
thing can be said of any form of advocacy that is fully protected by
the First Amendment.
Perhaps both Post and Weinstein (both of whom have prepared
responses to this Article) could respond that strategically selective
political expression is protected not for its informational value but
because it represents a speaker's participation in "public discourse."
But I find that response no more satisfactory. They have failed to
explain why speech contributing to "public discourse" is deserving of
greater protection, and they have failed to explain exactly what the
concept of "public discourse" even means. The argument that
allowing speech contributing to public discourse increases
151. See discussion supra Part II.C.I.
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"legitimacy" of the system is conclusory and unhelpful, because they
have failed to explain by reference to what normative standard of
political theory they are measuring the concept of legitimacy in the
first place. A benevolent dictator might argue that his government
retains "legitimacy," because its decisions are grounded in a
paternalistic effort to guide those who, left on their own, would be
unable to maximize their welfare. Thus, Post's and Weinstein's
assertions of legitimacy must first be grounded in an initial moral
commitment to self-determination-something they have totally
failed to do. It is as if one is walking into a movie theater in the
middle of the movie. Yet if they were to attempt to explain their
implicit commitment to self-determination, two puzzling (and
unanswered) questions arise. First, how do they define the scope of
"public discourse" in the first place? Second, how do we determine
that Consumer Reports does contribute to "public discourse," but
commercial advertising does not?
When every conceivably principled (or what I have called
internal) basis for discrimination against commercial speech is
shown to be irrationally underinclusive, it is possible to draw only
one of two conceivable inferences: (1) the asserted bases of
distinction do not represent the true grounds for exclusion, or (2) the
First Amendment interpreter mistakenly failed to recognize the
illogical underinclusiveness of the asserted basis of distinction. It
should be kept in mind, however, that discovering irrational
underinclusiveness is a classic method of unearthing viewpoint-
based discriminations. Otherwise, the prohibition on viewpoint
discrimination could be easily circumvented simply by invoking a
form of legalized sophistry.
Reliance on First Amendment intuitionism (or practical reason)
as a basis for exclusion of commercial speech from the scope of the
First Amendment gives rise to a more complex issue. However,
careful and critical analysis of the entire nature of intuitionist
constitutional thinking leads to one of two conclusions: (1) the
intuitionist label disguises what is at its foundation a form of
unprincipled constitutional analysis that in reality represents a form
of viewpoint discrimination; or (2) the intuitionist approach functions
as an enabler, implementing broader pre-existing societal hostility to
or disdain for particular types of expression.
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Both intuitionism and practical reason, it should be recalled, call
for an analysis that turns on a non-syllogistic form of contextual
reaction to a given set of circumstances. While it is not entirely clear
exactly what either approach actually entails, it is clear what they do
not entail: application of pre-existing generalized principles to
specific fact situations.'52 Absent this intellectually disciplined form
of inquiry, what remains can be nothing beyond some synthesis of
personal impressions and instincts, untied to any effort to discern
enduring, generalized and consistently applied constitutional
principles from the document's text, structure, or history. As a
definitional matter, then, use of intuitionism relies on the decision
maker's preexisting prejudices, instincts, and predilections. It is only
a small step from personal prejudices, instincts, and predilections
untied to a careful and reasoned analysis of abstract constitutional
principles to a decision grounded in the decision maker's viewpoint.
To the extent that practical reason seeks not to implement the
decision maker's personal preferences but rather those of society at
large, "'53 it simply transforms the source of the external viewpoint that
is to be implemented. In so doing, practical reason effectively turns
the entire basis of the First Amendment on its head. It would seem
not to be a controversial proposition to assert that the First
Amendment is designed to protect the assertion of unpopular views,
positions, perspectives and ideologies from suppression by the
majority. It is, then, nonsensical to let the scope of First Amendment
protection turn on an assessment of the normative instincts of society
as a whole. And this is so, even if we ignore the flawed assumption
implicit in this approach that somehow the unrepresentative,
unaccountable judiciary possesses an empirical pipeline to popular
perspectives. It hardly seems consistent with the foundations of the
First Amendment, for example, to suggest that during the
"pathological" periods of World War I, the post-World War I "red
scare" period, or the McCarthy era of the 1950s it was appropriate
for the judiciary to implement, through a judicial assessment of
public "sensibilities," the strongly held ideological prejudices of the
majority.'54
152. See discussion supra Part II.C.1-2.
153. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
154. Cf REDISH, THE LOGIC OF PERSECUTION, supra note 132, at 46-62; Blasi, supra note
63, at 449-50 (espousing the view that the First Amendment should function at its most
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Reliance on intuitionism or practical reason to justify the
exclusion of commercial speech from the First Amendment, then, is
no more principled a form of constitutional analysis than is reliance
on superficially principled but irrationally underinclusive bases of
distinction. The fact that the decision maker's reflexive personal
instincts, or the decision maker's rump assessment of societal
predilections and preferences, suggest that commercial speech is
somehow not worthy of First Amendment protection in no way
removes such analysis from characterization as invidious viewpoint
discrimination.
The most obvious form of viewpoint discrimination used to
justify reduced protection for commercial speech is open and candid
reliance on ideological disdain for commercialism.'55 When this
transparent ideological disdain is employed, we are left with the
paradigmatic example of twilight zone viewpoint discrimination. In
this situation, it is true that normative preferences untied to any good
faith effort to decipher and apply the First Amendment's underlying
values do not lead to discrimination premised on either the
preexisting ideological associations of the speaker or the ideological
positions taken in her speech. The fact remains, however, that the
decision to discriminate against commercial speech in the reach of
constitutional protection is made on the grounds of the decision
maker's personal ideological pre-disposition. It is difficult to
imagine a more pathological undermining of fundamental First
Amendment values.
V. CONCLUSION
Several years ago, I authored a book entitled Money Talks:
Speech, Economic Power and the Values of Democracy.'56 In it, I
argued that regulation of the use of money as expression and the
suppression of the speech of those with money caused significant
harm to the First Amendment. I gave a copy to an old friend and
colleague whose politics are far, far more conservative than my own.
protective during times when intolerance of unorthodox ideas pervades the social and political
climate).
155. See discussion supra Part IV.A. Professor Shiffrin's repeated expression of disdain for
materialism at the live symposium qualifies quite nicely for this categorization, I believe.
Shiffrin, Symposium Remarks.
156. REDISH, MONEY TALKS, supra note 18.
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After reading the book, he sent me the following brief but pithy e-
mail message: "Redish, I always knew you were a closet
Republican." Thinking I could educate him about the differences
between adherence to narrow personal political beliefs on the one
hand and implementation of the values of constitutional process on
the other, I sent back the following reply: "The fact that I believe in
the free speech rights of corporations and commercial advertisers no
more means I am a Republican than the fact that individuals who
supported the free speech rights of Communists in the 1940s
necessarily implied that they were Communists." He sent back a
single-sentence response: "Weren't they?"
There are, I believe, two important lessons to be learned from
this anecdote. First, it underscores both the importance and the
difficulty of separating personal political and ideological preferences
from comprehension of the ideological humility central to a
commitment to a viable system of free expression. No viable system
of free expression can survive where the guardian of the First
Amendment determines protection on the basis of the speech's
consistency with her own ideological predilections. Second, it
demonstrates the close-and often unrecognized-link between
commercial speech and political ideology. Commercial speech, as
defined by both the Court and hostile commentators, does not
include all speech concerning commercial products and services. As
previously noted,157 none of the scholarly opponents of commercial
speech protection would suggest that Ralph Nader's criticisms of the
Chevrolet Corvair's safety or The New York Times columnist Bob
Herbert's criticisms of Nike's foreign production process fall into the
category of less protected commercial speech. However, when
Chevrolet defends the safety of its product or Nike denies the
charges about its use of sweatshop labor, somehow the expression is
magically transformed into lesser protected commercial speech. It is,
then, only advocacy on the part of commercial enterprises about its
products and services that is deemed less deserving of constitutional
protection.
The point of this Article has been to connect the constitutional
and political dots. It has been wrongly assumed by many that the
arguments for excluding commercial speech from the scope of the
157. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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First Amendment represent plausible contributions to the debate over
the shaping and application of constitutional principles gleaned from
analysis of the normative foundations of free expression. It has also
been wrongly assumed that commercial speech may appropriately be
excluded from the First Amendment's scope without undermining
any fundamental constitutional values, because commercial speech
is, at best, only peripheral to those values. Ironically, the inaccuracy
of both of these assumptions is best underscored by seeing the link
between these two flawed assumptions about commercial speech: the
very fact that many wish to exclude commercial speech from
protection on grounds completely ignored when relevant to other
types or subjects of speech actually suggests the invidious political
and ideological presumptions often underlying the attacks on
commercial speech.
When, in the 1940s and 50s, scholars opposed constitutional
protection for the speech of Communists, they often did so on the
basis of an ideological world view that found such expression
ideologically offensive.'58  Hopefully, if an identical political
situation were to arise today, cooler heads in the world of free speech
scholarship would prevail and recognize that ideological hostility to
the views of Communists cannot properly be used as a basis to
exclude their speech from the First Amendment's scope. And this is
true, whether we seek to achieve that end by irrationally (or
strategically) selective use of more principled grounds, vague notions
of intuitionism or practical reason, or open reliance on contrary
ideology.
To be sure, hostility to commercial speech is probably one step
removed from hostility to Communist expression, because the
suppressed speech is not, standing alone, what is deemed offensive
by the regulators. However, I have demonstrated here that where the
speech is suppressed because of the regulators' hostility to the
"ideological ether" that pervades the regulated speech and speaker,
the harms to First Amendment values are just as great. It is time to
recognize opposition to commercial speech protection for what it all
too often is: a form of ideological hostility to the premises of
158. See, e.g., Carl Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of 1954: A Proposed Legal-
Political Theory of Free Speech, 23 U. CHI. L. REv. 173, 217-20 (1956) (arguing that the passage




capitalism and commercialism. As was true of those who sought to
protect the free speech rights of Communists in the mid-twentieth-
century, one surely need not agree with the ideological premises
underlying either capitalism in general or the commercial speech
sought to be regulated in particular to find such suppression
ominous.
In the live symposium that gave rise to this issue of the Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review, Professor James Weinstein, commenting
on a prior draft of this Article, suggested that in effect I was calling
all those jurists and scholars who oppose full protection for
commercial speech "either fools or knaves."'59 Certainly, those terms
would not have been my choice as to how to describe my conclusion.
But consider once again the hypothetical ordinance making it a crime
to bum the American flag. Assume that a scholar or jurist seeks to
justify this ordinance on the grounds that the burning of the
American flag would give rise to a serious fire hazard, completely
ignoring the absurd underinclusiveness that characterizes such an
argument. How should one describe those who make such a
nonsensical argument: as a fool, because they mistakenly fail to see
the obvious point that burning the Iranian or North Korean flags give
rise to the exact same danger, or as a knave, because of the thinly
disguised viewpoint-based and manipulative nature of the argument?
The only exception, I suppose, would be those scholars or jurists
who are consistent in what I consider their underprotection of
expression. The line of demarcation, as I have suggested throughout
this Article, is whether the scholar or jurist who opposes full
protection for commercial speech would simultaneously extend full
protection to Consumer Reports. Those who believe in a narrowly
political version of the First Amendment-for example, Judge Bork,
and perhaps Professor Weinstein himself-would logically exclude
from full protection both commercial advertising and Consumer
Reports. While I would certainly disagree with so narrow a
perspective on the First Amendment's scope, I could not reasonably
characterize their positions as either discriminatory or viewpoint
based. The same, however, clearly could not be said of those who
seek to distinguish between the two. Whether well intentioned or
159. James Weinstein, Remarks at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Symposium:
Commercial Speech: Past, Present & Future (Feb. 24, 2007).
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not, scholars and jurists who would simultaneously extend full
constitutional protection to Consumer Reports but fail to do the same
for promotional commercial speech are, in fact, guilty of something.
They have either failed to grasp the absence of any principled
constitutional distinction between the two, or have intentionally
sought to impose non-existent distinctions for narrow ideological
reasons. For reasons explained in this Article, neither represents an
acceptable approach to First Amendment interpretation.
